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Abstract
Firm performance is central to economic growth of developing economies. How-
ever, it is affected by the business environments in which a firm operates. These
business environments includes: features of legal and regulatory services, infrastruc-
tures, financial and institutional systems of the country. A burgeoning literature
within development economics seeks to understand the constraints that a firm face
and strategies to cope with these problems. However, a rigorous empirical study
that informs policy makers and concerned development institutions is still lacking
especially in Sub-Sahara African countries where the problem is severe.
Thus, this thesis focused on examining the impact of business environment on firm
performance and how firms respond to poor business environment. The study mainly
focused on examining the impact of poor electricity supply, its economic cost and
how firms responds to a poor power supply.
The thesis is organized in two chapters. The first chapter “power outages, economic
cost and firm performance: Evidence from Ethiopia”deals with how firms in Ethiopia
respond to power interruptions and estimating the economic cost of power outages
using two rounds of firm-level survey data. The study employed the World Bank
Enterprise Survey (WBES) data collected from firms operating in Ethiopia during
2011 and 2015. The result shows that firms in Ethiopia self-generate electricity in
response to power outages. Power outages were found to affect firms’ productivity
negatively, increasing firms’ costs by 15% from 2011 to 2015. This effect varied
negatively with output level, suggesting that power outages is particularly costly for
small firms. This chapter is a single authored paper and published in the Journal
of Utilities Policy (53) 111-120 1.
The second chapter “firm performance under infrastructure constraint: evidence
from Sub-Saharan African firms” deals with the role of investment in self-generation
in mitigating outage loss and evaluating the outage loss differential between firms
1The article can be accessed from: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2018.06.009
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that invested in self-generation and those that didn’t. Using the WBES data col-
lected from firms operating in 13 Sub-Saharan African countries, the study provided
an evidence that though self-generation has helped firms reduce outage loss, firms
that have invested in self-generation continue to face higher unmitigated outage
loss compared to firms without such investment. In spite of this, firms that have
invested in self-generation would have incurred 36%-99% more than their current
outage loss if they didn’t engage in self-generation while firms that didn’t invest
in self-generation would have reduced their outage loss by 2% - 24% if they had
engaged in self generation. This chapter is also a single authored paper.
Given the above result, the study proposed a differential supply interruption to
be followed by public authorities based on firms’ degree of vulnerability. Stating
differently, firms whose operation are more vulnerable to power outages should get
preferential power supply advantage. This could be possible by arranging a binding
contract between a vulnerable firms and power companies, so that power companies
charge an optimal tariff for supplying secure power for vulnerable firms. In turn,
firms should be compensated if the power companies fail to do so. This helps
vulnerable firms expand their production without fearing the risk of power outage.
Keywords: Power Outages, Firm, Self-generation Sub-Sahara Africa, Ethiopia
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1 Power Outages, Economic Cost and Firm
Performance: Evidence from Ethiopia
Abstract
The lack of secure and reliable electrical power is a constraint to doing business in
developing countries. Industrial firms in developing countries adopt different strate-
gies to cope with deficiencies in electricity supply. This paper employs the World
Bank Enterprise Survey data to examine how firms in Ethiopia respond to power
outages and estimate the resulting economic cost of power outages. The results
show that firms in Ethiopia self-generate electricity in response to power outages.
Power outages were found to affect firms’ productivity negatively, increasing firms’
costs by 15% from 2011 to 2015. This effect varied negatively with output level,
suggesting that outage is particularly costly for small firms.
Keywords: Power outages, Self-generation, Firm, Ethiopia
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Chapter 1
Power Outages, Economic Cost and Firm Performance:
Evidence from Ethiopia
1.1 Introduction
Ethiopia has electricity generating potential of 650 TWh per year, of which 40% is
technically feasible. This constitutes 15% of total technically feasible potential of
Africa (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2012). Currently, the country has
about 2,421MW of installed power generating capacity, of which 87% comes from
hydropower (Ethiopian Electric Power, 2015).
Even though the country has substantial electricity generating potential and there
have been marginal improvements in recent years, the country is still characterized
by being one of the least electrified in the World and has low per capita electric-
ity consumption. Frequent and prolonged power outages and this poor supply of
electricity are a major constraint to doing business faced by the industrial sectors.
The country is also poorly ranked on the Ease of Doing Business index, published
annually by the World Bank, ranking 161th out of 190 countries considered(World
Bank, 2017).
The 2011 World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) report shows that electricity is
the most severe constraint to doing business accounting for approximately 25% for
average large industries and approximately12% for average medium industries. In
2015, electricity was the second largest constraint to doing business in Ethiopia,
accounting for 10%, next to lack of access to finance (World Bank, 2015).
Poor supply of electricity can increase industrial firm’s costs, steering their techno-
logical choices away from energy-intensive technology and increasing the overall cost
of production. This further affects firm’s competitiveness by causing firms to resort
to alternative methods, which reduces product quality, halts production, and delays
order delivery. A poor supply of electricity also affects investment decisions and
firm location. This has a negative cumulative effect on a firm’s growth. Abeberese
(2016) shows that, in countries where the supply of electricity is highly unreliable,
10
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“firms lack the incentive to either move to productivity-enhancing industries or grow
larger, since doing so comes with the cost of relying on electricity.”
Given the prevalence of power outages, firms may respond in several ways to mitigate
the associated outage costs. The commonly-adopted coping strategy is investment
in self-generation. However, investment in self-generation undermines firms’ pro-
ductivity by forcing firms to channel their finances to less productive investment.
Existing empirical evidence shows that self-generation of electricity is costlier than
the electricity from the public grid (Steinbuks and Foster, 2010; Oseni and Pollitt,
2015; Adenikinju, 2003). The high cost of self-generation contributes to a fall in
productivity through its impact on capital utilization in the short-term by inducing
firms to reallocate and selectively utilize the most electricity-efficient way of produc-
tion and substitute electricity for material inputs (Fisher-Vanden et al., 2015). This
indicates that a higher cost of electricity may induce firms to alter input utiliza-
tion, which forces them to operate below their full capacity. This could also further
induce firms to invest in electricity efficient technology in the long term.
The way that firms respond to power outages partly depends on the nature of
power outages. A firm may choose either to invest in backup energy or to outsource
production of electricity-intensive intermediate inputs. However, it is not clear from
the few previous studies whether power outages either lead to electricity efficiency
or force firms to substitute electricity by material input. In this regard, Fisher-
Vanden et al. (2015) provided a comprehensive empirical study, using a translog
cost function, how Chinese industrial firms respond to electricity shortages. While
the study shows how Chinese firms respond to electricity shortages, it is difficult to
infer the equivalent result for firms in Ethiopia due to differences in the nature and
severity of power supply interruptions in the two countries. This study, like that
of Fisher-Vanden et al. (2015), employs a translog cost function in estimating the
economic cost of power outages. However, this study used actual firm level outage
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data reported by firm themselves unlike that of (Fisher-Vanden et al., 2015). The
authors used industry-level estimates of the ratio of thermal electricity generated
to thermal electricity capacity as a measure of power shortages. Furthermore, this
paper focuses on firms in SSA where the problem of power outage is more severe.
The purpose of this study is, therefore, to investigate how firms in Ethiopia respond
to power interruptions and estimate the resulting economic cost using two rounds
of firm-level survey.
The remaining part of the study is organized as follows: section 2.2 presents an
overview of electricity production and consumption in Ethiopia. Conceptual frame-
work and hypothesis of the study are discussed in Section 1.3 while review of re-
lated literature is presented in section 2.4. Data sources and descriptions, estimation
strategies, and the empirical model are discussed in section 1.5. Section 1.6 presents
the empirical results. Conclusions drawn from the study and resulting policy impli-
cations are presented in section 1.7.
1.2 Overview of Electricity Production and
Consumption in Ethiopia
Ethiopia has electricity generation potential of more than 45,000 MW from hy-
dropower; of which 30,000 MW is economically feasible which is equivalent to an
electricity generation of 162 TWh. The country has untapped potential in the ar-
eas of geothermal and wind which has an electricity generating potential of 5,000
MW and 10,000 MW respectively. However, only a fraction of this potential has
been harnessed so far. Currently, Ethiopia has around 2,421MW of installed power
generating capacity, out of which 87% (Figure 1.1) is generated from hydropower
(Ethiopian Electric Power, 2015).
Even though there is a huge improvement in electricity generation of the country, the
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electricity supply in the country is far below satisfying the growing demand. Demand
for electricity is growing by more than 25% (Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation,
2012). This is attributed to high population and economic growth, expansion of grid
extension to rural towns and villages, and shifts in household energy consumption
in major towns from wood-fuel and kerosene to electricity.
Figure 1.1: Electricity Production by Source (GWh)
Source: IEA,2014
Power consumption in the country has increased significantly following economic
growth the country has been experiencing since 2005. The country’s economy has
been growing at a staggering averaging Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth
rate of 10.8% since 2005 with all the major sectors of the economy have shown a
remarkable leap forward (MoFED, 2010). In line with this economic growth, power
consumption in the country has increased significantly. The total final electricity
consumption has increased from 907 GWh in 1990 to more than 6529 GWh in 2014
(International Energy Agency, 2014).
In terms of sector, industrial sector was the end-use sector that on average consumed
the most delivered electricity till end of 2005/06 followed by households (Figure 1.2).
The rural electrification program of the government and a shift from wood-fuel
and kerosene to electricity for cooking in major cities of the country has triggered
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household consumption of electricity to increase significantly after 2010/11(Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2012).
Figure 1.2: Electricity Consumption by Sector (1990-2014) in GWh
Source: IEA, 2014
However, Ethiopia is still among countries characterized by least electrified and low
electricity consumption per capita. Much of the country’s energy demand comes
from biofuels and wastes. While world electricity consumption has been steadily
increasing over the past decades, Ethiopia’s electric power consumption per capita
doesn’t show much improvement International Energy Agency (2014). The country’s
annual electricity per capita consumption has shown sluggish improvement from 18
KW per capita in 1971 to 65 KW per capita in 2013. As it was shown below (Figure
1.3), this is much below even the average Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) which is 324
KW per year in 1971 and 488 KW per year in 2013 (World Bank, 2016).
Even though a lack of access to electricity is a problem for many of the SSA countries,
Ethiopia is poorly ranked in terms of energy progress. According to International
Energy Agency (2014), about 69 million people in Ethiopia lack access to electricity.
The country is poorly rated on energy indicators. Bersisa (2016) found the energy
poverty rate in Ethiopia is 74 per cent and 73 per cent in 2011 and 2014 respectively.
Ethiopia was least ranked based on IEA’s Energy Development Index (EDI) in
14
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2012 with EDI score of 0.04. Similarly, on Oxford University’s Multidimensional
Energy Poverty Index (MEPI), which measure the incidence and intensity of energy
poverty, Ethiopia has a score of 0.9 with one showing total deprivation or suffer
from acute energy poverty. The energy intensity level of Ethiopia has declined
from 28.63 MJ/GDP in 1990 to 17 MJ/GDP in 2012. Even though there is an
improvement in recent years, the figure is even much higher than the SSA which is
10.44 MJ/GDP and 7.9 GDP respectively for the year under consideration. This
implies that Ethiopia requires more energy to produce a unit of output or undertake
a given activity than other average SSA countries need.
Figure 1.3: Electricity Power Consumption Per Capita (KWh per capita)
Source: World Bank, 2016
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Figure 1.4: Electricity Intensity Level (MJ/GDP)
Source: WB/WDI, 2016
1.3 Conceptual Framework
Assume a production function with five inputs: capital (K), labor (L), material
(M), electricity (E) and non-electric energy (N). Following the approach of Fisher-
Vanden et al. (2015), a firm’s response to power outages can be inferred from the
changes in input utilization due to a lack of electricity. Assume that a firm using
these inputs produces output Q,
Q = F (K, L, M, E, N, S) (1.1)
where S denotes the probability of blackouts, which measures resource inadequacy.
If the supply of electricity is reliable, i.e. S = 0, the dual of the unconstrained cost
function of the above production functions is given as:
Cu = Cu(Pk, Pl, Pm, Pe, Pn, Q) (1.2)
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Using the Shephard’s Lemma, the optimal demand for factor input is given as:
Xi =
∂Cu(Pk, Pl, Pm, Pe, Pn, Q)
∂Px
(1.3)
where Xi = K,L,M,E,N
Assuming the production function takes the form of log-linear, an expression for
value share of factor inputs can be derived as:
∂lnCu
∂Px
= ∂C
∂Px
Px
C
= X
∗
i Px
C
(1.4)
where Xi = K,L,M,E,N
It can be supposed that there is some probability that the electricity supply is
unreliable. The measure of electricity unreliability is normalized into one so that it
shows the probability that a firm faces one day of power cut in a year, i.e. S ∈ (0, 1).
Let e be the constrained level of electricity associated with periodic blackouts, 0 ≤
e < e∗. Thus, the constrained cost function is given as:
LnCc = lnCc(Pk, Pl, Pm, Pe, Pn, e¯) (1.5)
A risk neutral firm minimizes the expected cost function of producing a given amount
of Q¯,
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ElnC(Q¯) = SlnCc(Q¯) + (1− S)lnCu(Q¯) (1.6)
The partial derivative of cost in equation (1.6) due to a change in electricity unreli-
ability measures the effect of electricity unreliability on a firm’s production cost,
∂E(lnC)
∂S
= lnCc(Q¯)− SlnCu(Q¯) > 0 (1.7)
The effect of blackouts on the expected value share (Vshxi) can be analyzed by taking
partial derivatives of the equation (1.4) with respect to S. The price of electricity is
not entered in the constrained cost function because of constraint on its availability.
∂Vshe
∂S
= ∂
2lnC
∂Pe∂S
= ∂lnCc
∂Pe
− lnCu
lnPe
= − lnCu
lnPe
< 0 (1.8)
A firm’s response to power outages can be analyzed by critically examining the
response of input value shares due to changes in electricity unreliability, S.
One of the most common strategies that firms adopt to cope with power outage is
self-generation of electricity. This would result in an increased use of non-electric
energy. This implies that non-electric energy substitutes for electricity from the
public grid.
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∂Vshn
∂S
= ∂
2lnC
∂Pn∂S
= ∂lnCc
∂Pn
− ∂lnCu
∂lnPn
> 0 (1.9)
Another response to power outage is outsourcing production of electricity-intensive
goods. During a period of power outages, a firm may decide to purchase electricity-
intensive intermediate inputs rather than producing them from raw materials. In
this case, outsourcing could result in reduced use of labor, capital, and non-electric
energy. This is given as;
∂Vshm
∂S
= ∂
2lnC
∂Pm∂S
= ∂lnCc
∂Pm
>
∂lnCu
∂lnPm
(1.10)
Lastly, a firm may respond to electricity outages by improving its overall energy
efficiency. This would likely cause the share of capital to increase while causing that
of electricity and non-electric energy inputs to decline.
∂Vshk
∂S
= ∂
2lnC
∂Pk∂S
= ∂lnCc
∂Pk
>
∂lnCu
∂lnPk
(1.11)
Thus, based on the above theoretical discussions, this study tests the following
hypotheses proposed by (Fisher-Vanden et al., 2015).
H1: Power outage decreases the productivity of a firm
Power outages affect production activities in several ways, eventually having a neg-
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ative effect on productivity. A discontinuous supply of power interrupts the produc-
tion process, causing productive resources to be idle. Power outages also force firms
to invest in generators, which is an additional cost for a firm. Even when firms’
backup their electricity demand by investing in generators, they may continue to
suffer losses because of their inability to completely backup their electricity load.
H2: Self-Generation
Due to the nature of their business activity, some firms are more vulnerable to power
outages than are others. Even within a given firm, some functions of the business
are more vulnerable to power outages than are others, so that an outage of a given
duration may cause large losses in certain parts of the business, while other parts
may be left virtually unaffected. Thus, to avoid such losses, firms have an incentive
to act by self-generating that would mitigate some, if not all, of the damage caused
by power outages.
H3: Outsourcing
Production of intermediate inputs, especially those that are electricity-intensive, is
challenging for a firm during a period of power outages. It would be optimal for a
firm to purchase these inputs rather than to produce them in-house. It is rational
to expect that firms outsource the production of electricity-intensive intermediate
goods during a period of power outages. This, in turn, negatively affects the pro-
ductivity of a firm because, when a firm is substituting materials for electricity, it
is forced to shift from making to buying these intermediate inputs.
H4: Improved energy-consumption efficiency
Firms may also respond to electricity outages by improving their overall energy-
consumption efficiency. This could be possible by selectively utilizing the most
electricity-efficient method of production, in addition to investing in electricity-
saving technologies. This would be a rational mitigation strategy if public author-
20
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ities promote energy-efficiency policies and power outage takes the form of quota
rationing
1.4 Related Literature
Many empirical studies have tested the impact of power outages on firm performance,
(for instance, Abotsi, 2015; Alam, 2013; Nyanzu and Adarkwah, 2016; Scott et al.,
2014). In testing the impact of power outages on firm performance, most empirical
studies have used a proxy measure of power outage. Alam (2013) and Thomas and
Dalgaard (2013) used meteorological satellite data lightning density as an instrument
for power outages, while Fisher-Vanden et al. (2015), used industry-level estimates,
the ratio of thermal electricity generated to thermal electricity capacity. Allcott
et al. (2014) instrumented electricity shortage with shifts in electricity supply from
hydroelectric power availability. On the other hand, several studies (for instance,
Abotsi, 2015; Adenikinju, 2003; Oseni and Pollitt, 2015, 2013) used a firm-level
survey data to study the economic cost of power outages and how this affects firm
performance.
Numerous studies have used different techniques to try and estimate the cost asso-
ciated with power interruptions. For instance, Adenikinju (2003); Bental and Ravid
(1982); Oseni and Pollitt (2015); Steinbuks and Foster (2010), inferred outage costs
from actions taken by firms. However, this method sometimes provides only an up-
per or a lower limit on outage cost estimates (Balducci et al., 2002). Other studies,
Caves et al. (1992); Pasha et al. (1989), have used survey methods in which firms
are asked to report the losses suffered due to outages. This approach is attractive
in that it yields the distribution of outage costs across customers. There are also
studies, for instance, Castro et al. (2016), that have adopted a production function
approach to estimate the cost of power interruptions.
Power outages affect business activities in several ways. However, their impact
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varies across firms, based on the degree of their vulnerability and the generating
capacity of a self-generating firm relative to its own electricity requirements (Oseni
and Pollitt, 2015). The cost of power outages also varies across firm size and the type
of economic activity that a firm is engaged in. In this regard, Adenikinju (2003);
Moyo (2012) found that power interruption is particularly harmful to small firms
because they are unable to finance the cost of backup energy. On the other hand, a
study by Oseni and Pollitt (2015) showed that larger firms face greater outage loss.
They suggested that this is mainly because larger firms use more machine-dependent
production processes than do small firms.
The cost of power outages also depends on the nature of the power interruptions that
a firm faces. Power outages can be characterized in several dimensions, including
duration, frequency, the timing of interruption, and advance notification. Some
studies have considered the impact of such characteristics on outage costs. Billinton
et al. (1982) and Ontario (1980) reported that firms experience high outage costs
initially but that the cost diminishes rapidly as the duration increases. With regards
to the frequency of interruptions, business enterprises prefer infrequent long duration
interruptions to frequent short duration interruptions (Billinton et al., 1982; Ontario,
1980). Scott et al. (2014) obtained a similar result, showing that frequent power
outages are associated with lower firm productivity. Studies on the impact of the
timing of power interruptions and advance notifications are limited due to data
constraints.
Many empirical studies have been devoted to examining the strategies adopted by
firms to reduce the associated costs of outages. The most commonly-adopted strat-
egy has been found to be investment in self-generation (Adenikinju, 2003; Oseni
and Pollitt, 2015; Steinbuks and Foster, 2010). Steinbuks and Foster (2010) found
that both the incentive to invest in a generator and the capacity of the generator
installed are greatly affected by firm size, sector, corporate structure, and export
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orientation. The incentive to invest in self-generation also depends on firms’ degree
of vulnerability to power interruption (Oseni and Pollitt, 2015). Due to the nature
of their business activity, some firms are more vulnerable to power outage than are
others. Ghosh and Kathuria (2014) explained the difference in firms’ degrees of
vulnerability as transaction-specific costs. They treated electricity provision as a
transaction and showed that there is a corresponding transaction cost when a firm
faces a power outage. They found that a firm facing high transaction costs has more
incentive to invest in self-generation of electricity.
The adaptation strategy adopted by a firm depends partly on the nature of the
power interruption. According to Alam (2013), short-run power cut may not induce
firms to invest in generators. Fisher-Vanden et al. (2015) also show that Chinese
firms do not self-generate electricity during power outages but, “rather, re-optimize
among production inputs by substituting materials for energy.”
Empirical research on outages in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have focused on estimat-
ing the economic cost of power outages. However, it is not clear from these studies
whether electricity outages lead to electricity efficiency or force firms to substitute
material for electricity. This paper differs from earlier studies in SSA in the follow-
ing ways. First, a cost function is employed to estimate how power outages affects
firms’ production costs and to test whether power outages affect either input factor
shares or overall productivity and how they affect firms’ input utilization. Second,
the two rounds of firm-level data are used, which provides for a richer analysis than
previous studies in the area.
1.5 Methodology
1.5.1 Data Source and Description of Variables
The major source of data for this study is the 2011 and 2015 WBES on firms
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operating in Ethiopia. The survey used a stratified random sampling technique,
and firms were stratified based on their size, sector, and region. Four regions and
two self-administrative cities were selected from nine regional states and two self-
administrative cities of Ethiopia. The size stratification is based on the number
of permanent full-time workers reported and is defined as: micro (less than five
employees), small (5–19 employees), medium (20–99 employees), and large (more
than 99 employees). A total of 644 firms were surveyed in 2011. In addition to these
644 firms interviewed in 2011, fresh firms were introduced into the survey, making
a total of 848 firms interviewed in 2015.
The empirical estimation for the behavioral response of firms to power outages
requires firm-level data on production inputs and the amount spent by firms on
factor inputs. In the survey, firms were asked to report their annual expenditures on
wages and salaries for workers, intermediate inputs, and electrical and non-electrical
energy. All the reported expenditures in local currency have been converted to the
equivalent USD using the 2015 market exchange rate.
Using these firm-level data, the input prices are computed by firm and year based
on expenditure data. Accordingly, the price of labor (Pl) is computed as the annual
sum of wages, salaries, and bonuses divided by the number of full-time permanent
workers in the company during the year. The price of capital (Pk) is imputed from
a firm’s total value added minus its total expenditure on labor, divided by the net
book value of its assets.
The price of materials (Pm) for a given specific industry is computed as a composite
of the annual industry producer price index weighed by the input-output share for
that firm’s industry. The input-output shares of a firm based on two-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are obtained from the Social Account Matrix
(SAM) of Ethiopia. Firms in the same two SIC classifications face the same material
inputs over time. The price of electricity (Pe) is obtained from Ethiopian Electric
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Power (EEP), while the price of non-electric (Pn) is obtained from German Agency
for International Cooperation. In the WBES dataset, there is no information on
the quantity of final output. Thus, the deflated total annual sale by general price is
used as a proxy for the final output of a firm.
1.5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1: Summary of Input Prices and Input Value Shares
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev.
TC Total Cost (USD) 271665.5 498520.4
Output(Q) Deflated annual sales (USD) 408763.7 1957976
Outages(S) Power outages1 0.1357 0.9180
Vshk Value share of capital (%) 0.0105 0.035
Vshl Value share of labor (%) 0.1021 0.158
Vshr Value share of raw material (%) 0.8027 0.030
Vshe Value share of Electricity (%) 0.0110 0.206
Vshn Value share of nonelectric input (%) 0.0755 0.11
Pl Price of labor (per person) 227.02 447.7
Pk Price of capital 3.916 122.9
Pm Price of Material 99.16 16.0
Pe Price of electricity (per KWh) 0.022 0.01
Pn Price of nonelectric energy 0.911 0.02
Source:Computed based on WBES (2011 and 2015)
Table (1.1) reports summary statistics of the total cost (in USD), deflated annual
sales in constant (USD), value share of factor inputs, and input prices for each of
the factors of production.
The average factor value shares disaggregated to sectoral level are given in Table
(1.2). Material input share is the highest percentage of average value shares across
all sectors. All industries use electricity; thus, power interruption affects them either
directly or indirectly. The average value share of non-electric energy is greater than
is that of electricity. This may be due to non-electric energy being costlier than
is the electricity supplied from the public grid and firms resorting to the use of
non-electric energy sources during power outages.
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Table 1.2: Average Input Value Shares by Industry
Value share
Sector Capital Labor Mater. Elec. Nonel.
Garments, Leather and Textile 1.56 12.23 79.29 1.11 5.71
Food 0.745 9.64 82.40 1.05 6.15
Metals, Machinery and Equipments 1.568 11.43 80.32 0.71 5.95
Nonmetals, Plastics and Paper 1.234 18.17 71.96 1.17 7.45
Wood and Paper 2.048 17.70 70.87 1.14 8.12
Wholesaler, Retailer and Other Services 1.030 8.56 80.97 1.14 8.29
Electronics, Printing, and Publishing 0.765 10.21 80.75 0.70 7.56
Hotels and Restaurant 0.445 5.05 84.70 0.24 7.56
Transport 0.529 6.34 85.38 0.26 7.46
Construction 0.582 6.54 84.85 0.36 7.65
Chemicals and Others 1.513 11.06 79.08 0.68 7.65
Source:Computed based on WBES (2011 and 2015)
In addition to production data, the empirical estimation requires firm-level measures
of power outages. A power outage in this study is measured by the number of days
that a firm is without a power supply from the public grid. The total outage time
that a firm face is obtained by multiplying the number of outages that a firm faces
by the duration of the outages, and the total outage time is converted into days.
Table (1.3) reports summary of power outages both in hours and days per year. In
2011, a typical firm faces average power outage of about 548 hours in a year which
is equivalent to about 23 days. The figure has increased to more than 1680 hours
in a year during 2015 (about 70 days). Table (1.3) also presents power outages by
sector.
1.5.3 Empirical Model
In this section empirical model to be estimated for the analysis of the behavioral
response of firms to power outages is presented. The study follows Fisher-Vanden
et al. (2015) approach in order to test the hypothesis explained in section 1.3.
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Table 1.3: Power Outages by Sector and Over Year
Sector Outages (Hours/year) Outages (Days/year)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Garments,Leather and Textiles 634.99 559.36 26.45 23.30
Food 1550.25 11252.92 64.59 468.87
Metals, Machinery and Equipments 581.57 623.59 24.23 25.98
Nonmetals, Plastics and Paper 725.64 988.04 30.23 41.16
Wood and Furniture 541.88 496.28 22.75 20.67
Wholesaler, Retailer and Other Services 1314.03 7560.28 54.75 315.1
Electronics, Printing, and Publishing 800.84 978.36 33.36 40.76
Hotels and Restaurant 740.20 884.84 30.84 36.86
Transport 2464.74 16924 102.7 705.2
Construction 536.07 711.1 22.33 29.62
Chemicals and Others 2483.5 14816.72 103.5 617.4
Year of Survey
2011 547.94 634.83 22.83 26.45
2015 1682.81 10659.87 70.11 444.16
Overall 1189.31 8041.92 49.55 335.08
Source: Computed based on WBES (2011 and 2015)
The productivity effect of power outages can be estimated through production or
cost function; the choice of which depends on relevant exogeneity assumption and
statistical grounds. In production function estimation in which factor inputs deter-
mine the level of output, inputs quantities are assumed to be exogenous. Whereas
in cost function estimation, input prices are assumed to be exogenous. In this study,
since a firm level data is used in which the choice of quantity of factor inputs are
endogenous and factor prices more likely to be determined in the market, cost func-
tion approach is more appropriate to adopt. The translog cost function handles any
neutral and non-neutral efficiency differences among firms (observational units in
the data). Thus, because of its flexibility in functional form, the study adopts the
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translog cost function, which is specified as follows:
lnCijkt = α0lnSit + α1lnQitlnSit +
5∑
j=1
βjlnPijtlnSit +
5∑
j=1
δjlnPijt +
1
2
5∑
j=1
5∑
l=1
ϕjllnPiltlnPijt + κlnQit +
Λ
2 (lnQit)
2 (1.12)
+
5∑
j=1
φjlnQitlnPijt + ηk + εijkt
where Cijkt is the total production cost of firm i in industry j that produces output
Qit using input j at time t, Qit is annual output of a firm i at time t, Pijt is price of
input j at time t for firm i (where j includes capital, labor, material, electricity, and
nonelectric energy), ηk is industry fixed effect, εijkt is the error term, parameters
α0 and α1 measures the factor neutral effect of power outages allowing the effect to
vary with level of output while βj measures the factor biased productivity effect of
power outages.
Using Shephard’s Lemma, the cost share equation for each of the factor inputs can
be derived from equation (1.12)2 as:
V shijt = δj + βjlnSit +
∑
j
ϕjlnPijt + φjlnQit + εijt (1.13)
1.5.3.1 Estimation Strategy
Equations in (1.12) and (1.13) represents a system of equations in which shock to
2Even though there are five factors of production in our cost function, the add-up conditions
across all factors of production implies the covariance matrix would be non-invertible if all
value shares of input are included in the estimation. Thus, the main cost specification is
estimated along with four of the cost share equations__ value share for material is dropped.
As shown in Greene (2003), the coefficient estimates and standard errors are insensitive to the
value share dropped.
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factors shares are likely to be correlated across error structure of the model. Since the
systems of equations are related to each other through their error terms, there is an
efficiency gain by estimating the system of equations jointly. Thus, the above system
of equations is estimated by three stage least squares in panel data framework3.
For the cost function specified in equation (1.12) is to be well-behaved, i.e. exhibits
the usual property of symmetry and homogeneous of degree one in input prices, the
following restrictions are imposed.
ϕjl = ϕlj,
5∑
j=1
δj = 1,
5∑
j=1
ϕjl =
5∑
j=1
ϕlj =
5∑
j=1
φj = 0 (1.14)
The impact of power outages on firm’s cost of production can be truly measured only
if power outage is exogenous in our model. However, there are a number of reasons
that outage is endogenous in this model. Outages can be correlated with factors
influencing firm’s production cost/productivity such as location, industry composi-
tions and prevailing economic conditions in the country. There is also a possibility
of measurement error in power outages because of subjectivity in reporting. In order
to address the endogeneity and measurement error, the study utilized variation in
hydro- electric generation as instrumental variable in the cost function estimation.
Electricity from hydro power shares more than 87% in Ethiopia and its electricity
generating capacity depends on rain fall. The country has faced major electric-
ity shortages in periods of low recorded rain fall (Ethiopian Electric Power, 2015).
This shows variation in electricity generation majorly depends on rain fall and it
affects firms’ production cost only through outages. Thus, variation in hydro elec-
3To insure the estimation is invariant to the choice of deleted value share equation, the three
stage least square is iterated over the covariance matrix and parameter estimates (see Berndt
(1991, pp 474-475)
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tricity generation is a good candidate to be instrumental variable for power outages.
Variation in hydro generation is measured as the deviation from the mean annual
generation over the period of 2011 -2015.
Thus, using variation in hydro generation as instrument in the main specification
of translog cost function in equation (1.12), the reduced form regression of power
outages on variation in hydro generation and other explanatory variables of the
model in equation (1.12) is given by:
lnSijtk = θHt + θ1lnQitHt +
∑
j
τjlnPijtHt +
∑
j
ϕjlnPijt +
1
2
∑
j
∑
l
ϑjllnPiltlnPijt + ψlnQit + (1.15)
+∆2 (lnQit)
2 +
∑
j
υjlnQitlnPijt + µk + εijtk
This is estimated by three stage least square along with equations in (1.12)-(1.13)
imposing restrictions in equation (1.14).
The marginal cost and a change in total cost of production due power outages can
be computed from the main equation in (1.12). Taking the first order derivative of
cost function with respect our measure of power outages,
∂Cit
∂S
it
= α0Cit + α1lnQit
St
+
5∑
j=1
βj
lnPijt
St
(1.16)
Where j = K,L,M,E,N
The first term represents the factor neutral effect while the second term is the factor
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biased effect. The overall effect depends on the combination of the two effects. The
change in total cost of production due to change in power outages is thus, computed
using equation (1.16).
1.5.3.2 Tests on self-Generation
The evidence for self-generation can be tested from the model specified in equation
(1.12). For the self-generation hypothesis to hold, as stated above, interaction of
power outages and electricity should be negative and that of non-electric energy
interacted with power outage be positive.
In addition to this, a further test on self-generation is made by estimating a separate
regression of generator ownership (indicator of self-generation) on power outages and
other firm characteristics. For this issue, the study adopted Reinikka and Svensson
(2002) approach, recently employed by (Steinbuks and Foster, 2010).
A firm adopt a generator if the benefit to a firm from adopting is greater than other
options available to it. Thus, the decision to invest in backup energy (adopting
generators) by a firm can be modeled using a panel binary choice model.
y∗it = xitβ + εit, i = 1, 2..N ; t = 1, 2, ...T (1.17)
where εit = αi + uit, uit v N(0, δ2u);αi v IIN(0, δ2α)
From the latent variable model in equation (1.17) and the assumptions given, the
probability that a firm invest in self-generation is given as:
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Pr(yit = 1) = Pr(y∗it > 0/xit) =P [εit > −(x′itβ)/xit] (1.18)
=Φ(x′itβ)
where yit is the probability that firm i invests in self-generation, Φ is the standard
normal distribution function, xit is a vector of controls including frequency of power
interruptions and other firm characteristics that affects firm’s decision to invest in
self-generation.
The usual assumption to estimate the model in equation (1.17) is the unobserved
individual heterogeneity term, αi is independent of xit . However, it is unrealistic in
many cases to assume that the time invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity
αi is independent of the observable variables in xit (Mundlak, 1987; Chamberlain,
1982). As indicated in Mundlak (1987); Chamberlain (1982), it is possible to esti-
mate more precise parameter of the model in equation (1.17) by allowing for corre-
lation between αi and xit. This is done by including the time average of variables in
xit as additional regressors in the model. This works by specifying the unobserved
heterogeneity αi as follows:
αi = ψ + pi′x¯i + νi (1.19)
where νi ∼ IIN(0, δ2v) and x¯i is the average of time varying variables in the vector
xit
The estimation of the models in (1.18) and (1.19) by maximum likelihood method
is called a correlated random effect model (Wooldridge, 2010).
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1.6 Results
The first column of Table (1.4) report results based on the system of equations in
(1.12) and (1.13) along with equation (1.15). Because of the adding-up restriction
in equation (1.14), only four of the five value share equations in (1.13) are linearly
independent4. Thus, the value share of material is dropped from the system of
value share equations to have an invertible covariance matrix. In all estimations,
power outages and its interactions with input prices and output are instrumented
by variations in hydro generations as represented in equation 5 (1.15).
The results6 show that power outage leads to substitution among the factors of
production. More specifically, a power outage results in increased use of capital,
materials, and non-electric energy sources while the use of labor and electricity
decreases. For instance, every one standard deviation increase7 in a power outage
leads to an increase in the cost share of capital, material and non-electric energy
sources of 0.022, 0.032, and 0.040 standard deviations, respectively. The same one
standard deviation increment in a power outage leads to a decrease in the cost share
of labor and electricity of 0.011 and 0.003 standard deviations, respectively.
Referring to the research hypothesis in section 1.3, the result obtained supports the
decreased productivity effect of outage and self-generation as a coping strategy to
mitigate the associated outage cost. The productivity effect of power outage (H1)
depends on the factor-neutral and factor-biased effects, which is the same as testing
4If there are n value share equations, only n-1 of them are linearly independent because value
shares always sum to unity (see Berndt (1991, pp 371-372).
5Relevance test of the instrument shows a variation in hydro generation is significant and pos-
itively explains the power outages even though some of the interaction variables found to be
insignificant. In addition, the instrument passed Stock and Yogo weak test as the Wald test
critical values pertaining to Stock and Yogo weak instrument test ranges from 5.5 to 16.4 which
is less than the first stage F-statistics (See Appendix Table A.4).
6Full coefficient estimates of main specification is reported in Appendix Table A.1
7The variables of the models are standardized before estimation around their arithmetic mean,
as x∗ = (xi − x¯)/si , x¯ where is mean of the variable in the sample, and si is the standard
deviation. According to Walsh (cited in Bring (1994) standardized coefficients can be used to
assess relative importance of each of explanatory variables in predicting the dependent variable.
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the significance of α0 = α1 = 0 and βj = 0 in the main cost specification in
equation (1.12).
Table 1.4: Cost of Power Outages
Main specification CRS No interaction
Coef. Std.Dev Coef. Std.Dev. Coef. Std.Dev.
lnPklnOutage 0.022*** 0.024 -0.0005 0.0201 -0.0004 0.0201
lnPlnlOutage -0.011 0.016 -0.0221 0.0100 -0.0192 0.0161
lnPelnOutage -0.003* 0.002 -0.0038*** 0.0024 -0.0036* 0.0024
lnPnlnOutage 0.040** 0.020 0.0378*** 0.0200 0.0355* 0.0200
lnPmlnOutage 0.032** 0.018 0.0340** 0.0180 0.0366** 0.0180
lnOutputlnOutage -0.037* 0.022
lnOutput 0.669*** 0.101 1 0.6844*** 0.1014
lnOutage 0.027* 0.016 0.020*** 0.020 0.0212 0.0165
*** P≤0.01, **0.01< P≤0.05, * 0.05<P≤0.1. The dependent variable of the model is the log of
cost by firm and year. Add up and symmetricity restrictions are imposed, value share for material
inputs is dropped to have invertible covariance matrix and the estimation is made for the main
specification in equation (12) along with cost shares of the four factors of productions. In the second
column, constant returns to scale is imposed and coefficient associated interaction of output with
outages is set to zero. The third column does not include the interaction of output with outages.
In all cases, the restrictions imposed does insignificant changes compared to the result from the
main specification in column1.
The results show that the null hypothesis that power outage has no factor-neutral
or factor-biased effects is rejected in favor of an alternative hypothesis. The net
effect of power outages on a unit cost of production depends on the combination
of this factor-neutral and factor-biased effects. The positive factor-neutral effect
of outage indicated by the positive coefficient of outage alone shows that a one
standard deviation increment in power outages increases firms’ production costs by
0.027 standard deviations. This effect diminishes with the output level of the firm,
as indicated by the negative interaction of output and power outage. This indicates
that a power outage negatively affects a firm’s productivity and that the effect on
small firms is more pronounced, which is consistent with the first hypothesis of the
study. This is mainly because small firms face financial constraints in adapting to
power outages.
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Given the negative impact of a power outage, as confirmed by the first hypothesis
of the study, firms adopt different strategies to reduce the resulting cost of power
outages. The second hypothesis relates to self-generation of electricity as a coping
strategy to mitigate the cost of a power outage. The result obtained shows that an
increase in power outage leads to a decline in cost share of electricity, while the cost
share of alternative energy sources increases. This is in line with the self-generation
hypothesis, in which power outages induce firms to invest in self-generation when the
supply of power from the public grid is not available. To examine how self-generation
varies across firm size and other firm characteristics, a separate regression of a self-
generation indicator on firm characteristics and a measure of power outage are made
and discussed in the next section.
The third and fourth hypothesis of the study relate to the alternative coping strate-
gies that a firm adopts. There is evidence of an increment in the cost share of
materials due to increased outage intensity. This is indicated by a significant and
positive coefficient of material input. An increment in the cost share of material sup-
ports the outsourcing hypothesis; firms are induced to shift from making to buying
some of their intermediate goods. However, for this hypothesis to hold, the esti-
mated coefficient of electricity and non-electric energy sources should be negative.
On the contrary, the coefficient of non-electric energy source is positive. Thus, the
result does not support the outsourcing hypothesis. The result obtained also does
not support the improved energy-efficiency hypothesis, because there is no observed
decline in the cost share of non-electric energy in the result obtained. The short
time span of the data used in the study, however, may not be enough to show a
firm’s capital adjustment.
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1.6.1 Industry Heterogeneity
To account for heterogeneity among sectors in responding to power outages, the
system of equations in (1.12) and (1.13) is estimated by 3SLS separately for each
sector8. A significant response to a power outage in electricity share is observed in
the Food, Wholesaler, and Construction sectors. The negative coefficient associated
with the interaction of electricity and power outages in these sectors shows that
power outages reduce the cost share of electricity. The interaction coefficient of
outages with electricity and material inputs is positive and significant for many of
the sectors. This shows that the cost share of material input increases in response
to power outages. However, revisiting the earlier hypothesis, the result obtained is
noisy.
1.6.2 Further Test on Self Generation of Electricity
As a further test of the self-generation hypothesis, a separate estimation is made
using equations (1.18) and (1.19). Two measures of self-generation indicators are
used: the share of electricity consumption coming from self-generation and the in-
dicator variable of self-generation, which is a binary outcome. For firms that do not
invest in self-generation, the share of electricity coming from self-generation is zero.
Thus, the dependent variable is zero for a substantial number of firms in the sample.
For this model, Tobit is assumed9, as it is suited to model a problem of this nature
Verbeek (2004). For the self-generation indicator, a probit decision adoption is as-
sumed. The measure of power outage used in both specifications is the frequency
of power interruption that a firm faces in a year. Determinants of firm decision
to invest in self-generation are estimated using the regression approach stated in
equations 1.17 and 1.18. Both pooled probit and Correlated Random Effect Pro-
bit (CREP) are estimated. The likelihood ratio test on the coefficient of ρ, which
8The result is reported in A.3
9see Appendix 1.8.2 for the Tobit model specifications
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captures unobserved heterogeneity among firms, is significant. This indicates the
importance of capturing unobserved firm heterogeneity in the model which indicates
that CREP is more appropriate.
The positive and significant coefficient of a variable ownership shows that foreign-
owned firms are more likely to own generators compared to domestically owned
firms. Variable size in the model shows the number of full-time permanent workers
in the company. The estimated coefficient of the variable is positive and significantly
explains generator ownership. This indicates that larger firms are more likely to
invest in generators compared to small firms.
Table 1.5: Test for Self-Generation
Generator Ownership (=1 if Own) Share of self-generation
Variable Coef. Std.Dev Variable Coef. Std.Dev.
Exporter (=1 if export) 0.173 0.188 Exporter 0.404 0.350
Ownership (=1 if foreigner) 0.483** 0.201 Ownership 0.867** 0.349
Region (=1 if capital city) 0.530*** 0.123 Region 1.097*** 0.230
Manufacturing -0.121 0.210 Manufac. -0468 0.404
Retail -0.181 0.174 Retail -0.298 0.349
Large 0.480*** 0.151 Large 0.348 0.296
Medium 0.175* 0.262 Medium 0.673 0.490
lnAge 0.134 0.067 lnAge 0.438*** 0.140
lnSize 0.205*** 0.077 lnSize 0.289*** 0.130
ln (Freq.Inter) 0.162** 0.071 ln(Fre.Inter.) 0.392*** 0.133
ρ 0.319 0.111 ρ 0.214 0.090
Waldχ2(21)=87.86 Prob>χ2=0.00 Waldχ2(21) = 200.78 Prob> χ2= 0.000
LR test of ρ = 0:χ¯2(01) = 7.47 Prob ≥ χ¯2= 0.003
*** P ≤0.01, **0.01< P≤0.05, * 0.05<P≤0.1. ln(Freq.Inter) shows log of number of power inter-
ruptions. Two indicators of self-generation are used, generator ownership; estimated probit model
and the share of electricity from generator; estimated by Tobit model.
The variable of interest, the frequency of power interruptions, is both positive and
significant under both regressions. More specifically, frequent power interruption
increases the likelihood that firms invest in a generator and, hence, increases the
share of electricity coming from generators. Revisiting the earlier hypothesis, this
is in line with the self-generation hypothesis.
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1.6.3 Regularity Conditions
For the estimated cost function to be consistent with economic theory, it is important
to test if the estimated translog cost function satisfies certain regularity conditions,
mainly monotonicity and concavity. Monotonicity is tested by the sign of the pre-
dicted cost shares for each factor input at each observation. The result shows (see
A.2) that there are observations with negative predicted cost shares, implying that
cost is decreasing in the price of that input at that observation. However, this occurs
at relatively few points compared to the size of observation in the data.
For the cost function to be concave in input prices, the own price elasticity for
each factor input must be negative. This implies that the demand for factor input
decreases as the price of that input increases. This is confirmed by the estimated
own-price elasticities of inputs given along the main diagonal of the lower panel of
A.2. This is consistent with microeconomic theory, and the estimated own price
elasticities have the correct negative sign. Each pair of cross-price elasticity of input
have the same sign, however, they differ in magnitude because they depend on input
value shares. This satisfies the symmetricity condition imposed.
1.6.4 Costs of Power Outages
In this section, the marginal and total costs of power outage are computed using
equation (1.16) and the estimated factor-neutral and biased coefficients reported in
Table 1.4. The mean value of all the explanatory variables, including power outage,
is used for the marginal cost computation.
The overall marginal cost is $1,625, of which the factor-biased effect is $2,592, and
the factor-neutral effect is -$9,67. This shows that, in substituting one factor of
production for the other in response to power outages, the overall productivity
losses from the marginal increase in power outage offsets the marginal gains from
a marginal increase in outage. The factor bias effect is decomposed into each of
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the factor inputs, with a shift to non-electric energy sources in response to power
outages increasing the cost by $658, while capital and material increase the cost by
$761 and $2,628, respectively. The decreased use of electricity and labor partially
offsets the increased cost of production due to the shift to material and non-electric
energy sources.
Table 1.6: Marginal and Total Cost due to Outages (in USD)
Components Marginal Cost of outages % of aggregate cost
of cost cost of outages (2011-2015) (2011-2015)
Factor neutral -$986 -$45719 -8.6%
Factor biased $2592 $122549 23.2%
Capital $761 $35980 6.8%
Labor -$963 -$45530 -8.6%
Electricity -$492 -$23261 -4.4%
Non-electric $658 $31110 5.9%
Material $2628 $124251 23.5%
Net effect $1625 $76830 14.5%
The first column calculates marginal cost of power outages based on estimated coefficients and
mean values of explanatory variables. In the second, total cost of power outages due to the actual
change in power outages between 2011 and 2015 is computed. The last column divides the total
cost due to power outages in the second column by firm’s aggregate cost.
The second column of Table (1.6) reports the total cost due to the actual change
in the power outage. To calculate this, the marginal cost of outage reported under
the first column is multiplied by the actual change in the average duration of power
outages from 2011 to 2015. The overall total cost has increased by $76,830 which is
approximately 15% of a firm’s aggregate10 cost. Of this total, material input takes
the leading share, being approximately 23.5% of the aggregate cost.
The result obtained has similarities to the findings of Fisher-Vanden et al. (2015)
on the effect of power outages on firm productivity. The increase in firms’ cost of
production due to power outages is approximately 15%, higher than the figure ob-
tained by Fisher-Vanden et al. (2015) for China. This may be due to the differences
10Aggregate cost is obtained by taking the average total cost of production for each year and
aggregating over a year
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in the causes and severity of power outages between China and Ethiopia. However,
unlike the findings of Fisher-Vanden et al. (2015), the results obtained in this study
do not support the outsourcing hypothesis. On the contrary, firms in Ethiopia self-
generate electricity as an adaptation strategy to cope with power outages. Firms are
willing to invest in self-generation if the power outages will extend into the future,
while short-term power outages induce firms to outsource part of their production
(Alam, 2013). The results obtained thus suggest that, in a country like Ethiopia,
where power outages are both frequent and prolonged, self-generation emerges as
the strategy that firms adopt in mitigating the cost of outages. However, a cross-
country comparative study on the nature of power interruptions and firm strategies
are required to generalize this finding.
1.7 Conclusion and Policy Implications
1.7.1 Conclusions
This study employed the World Bank Entreprise Survey data for 2011 and 2015 to
examine the characteristics of power outages and how firms in Ethiopia respond to
this power interruptions. The economic cost of power outages and firms’ behavioral
responses to power interruption were examined using the translog cost function.
The findings show that there is factor substitution in response to power outages.
The factor shares of electricity and labor declined in response to power outages while
that of materials and non-electric energy increased. Firms in Ethiopia were found
to self-generate electricity to mitigate the cost of power outages. From the result
obtained, there is no evidence supporting the outsourcing and improved energy
hypothesis. Power outages affected firms’ productivity negatively, and the overall
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total cost due to outage increased by approximately 15% of firm’s aggregate costs
from 2011 to 2015. This effect varied negatively with output level, suggesting that
outage is particularly costly for small firms.
1.7.2 Policy Implications
The following policy implications may emerge from the results obtained. The
marginal cost of a power outage was found to be significant, and firms were found
to self-generate electricity to cope with the power outages. This suggests that there
is a market for investing in the power system, including building more power plants
to ensure reliable electricity supply. One means could be to remove subsidies and
introduce optimal tariffs to recover the costs of grid investment. This, in turn, could
help attract international and domestic private investors to the power sector11.
Generator ownership and the share of electricity coming from self-generation were
found to be positively correlated with firm size. This is mainly because small and
micro enterprises lack the resources to invest in self-generation of electricity. Under
this circumstance, shared generators could help small and micro enterprises access
and utilize backup power during power outages. Thus, in the short term, the gov-
ernment should facilitate the formalization of shared generators, particularly for
industrial parks, to avoid coordination challenges among firms.
11Currently, due to government subsidies, customers pay only 67% of the cost of electricity. Re-
vising the electricity tariff and hence attracting investors to the sector may need a regulation.
Therefore, there should be electricity regulation that ensures and encourages the participation
of private investors to the sector.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Additional results from chapter one
Table A.1: Full Coefficient Estimates of Main Specification
Industry fixed effects are not reported
1.8.2 Tobit Model specification
Let y∗ be a latent variable observable only for firms with positive amount of invest-
42
1.8 Appendix
Table A.2: Predicted Cost Shares and price elasticity of inputs
Predicted cost Shares
Model Capital Labor Electricity Nonelectric
Main 55 0 0 0
CRS 46 1 0 2
No interaction 59 0 3 0
Cross and own Elasticity of Inputs
Capital Labor Electricity Nonelectric
Capital -0.720 -0.204 0.042 0.055
Labor -0.290 -0.629 0.277 0.091
Electricity 0.217 0.586 -0.447 -0.350
Nonelectric 0.282 0.379 -0.772 -0.588
ment,
y∗it = αi + x′itβ + εit (1.20)
where αi ∼ N(0, δ2α) and εit ∼ N(0, δ2ε). yit = yit if y∗it > 0 and yit = 0 if y∗it ≤ 0
Since the share of electricity from self-generation is zero for firms that don’t invested
in self-generation, the dependent variable yit which represents the share electricity
from self-generation is left censored at zero. This can be written as:
yit =

αi + x′itβ + εit if y∗it > 0
0 if y∗it ≤ 0
(1.21)
The above model can be written in the following way
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Table A.3: Industry specific cost effect of power outages
Figures in brackets are standards errors. * Significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and ****
significance at 1%. Estimation by 3SLS.
Pr(yit > 0) = 1− Φ(−αi + x
′
itβ
δε
) (1.22)
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Table A.4: Test of Instrument Relevance
Variable Coef. Std.Err
Hvar 0.00530* 0.0024513
lnPkHvar 0.00024 0.0002276
lnPlHvar -0.00041 0.0002788
lnPeHvar 0.00536*** 0.0011781
lnPmHvar 0.00065** 0.0001883
lnOutputHvar 0.00026 0.000191
Stock and Yogo weak
10% 15% 20% 25%
2SLS size of nominal 5% Wald test 16.38 8.96 6.66 5.53
First stage F stat 24.68
Prob.>F 0.00
H0: Instrument is weak
Price of non-electric energy is omitted because of collinearity. Only the interaction of
instrumental variable with input prices and output is reported
where yit is capacity of firm’s generator measured by a share of electricity coming
from self-generation, xit is a set of explanatory variables including frequency of power
outages, Φ denotes the standard normal distribution function, δε is the standard
error of normally distributed error term, εit.
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2 Firm Performance Under Infrastructure
Constraints: Evidence from Sub-Sahara African
Firms
Abstract
The poor business environment mainly poor infrastructure is found to has paramount
importance in explaining Africa’s disadvantage relative to other similar countries.
To cope with this poor supply of electricity, firms adopt different mechanisms to
reduce the resulting effects. The commonly adopted coping strategy is investment
in self-generation of electricity. This study examined the role of investing in self-
generation in mitigating the outage loss and evaluated the outage loss differential
between firms that invested in self-generation and those that didn’t using WBES
data collected from firms operating in 13 SSA countries. The result obtained shows
that, though self-generation has reduced the amount of outage loss for firms that
have invested in self-generation, these firms continue to face higher unmitigated out-
age loss compared to firms without such investment. In spite of this, firms that have
invested in self-generation would have incurred 36%-99% more than their current
outage loss if they don’t engaged in self-generation. Similarly, firms that didn’t in-
vest in self-generation would have reduced their outage loss by 2% - 24% if they had
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engaged in self generation. The study thus, recommended a differential supply inter-
ruption to be followed by public authorities based on firms’ degree of vulnerability
to power interruptions.
Keywords: Power Outages, Self-generation, Firm, Sub-Sahara Africa
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2.1 Introduction
The business environment in which a firm operates –encompassing features of legal
and regulatory services, infrastructures, financial and institutional systems of the
country– has an important impact on firm performance. These business environ-
ments also called ‘investment climate’ varies across regions and countries. For this
matter, empirical studies aimed at investigating the impact of business climate on
firm outcomes proceed both at a firm and country level. Cross-country empirical
works show strong evidence that underdeveloped business environment is associated
with a poor investment, employment, and growth1.
A poor business environment mainly poor infrastructure is found to has paramount
importance in explaining Africa’s disadvantage relative to other similar countries.
According to the study by (Iacovone et al., 2014; Harrison et al., 2014), African firms
lead in productivity levels and growth when controlling for the political and business
environments. However, without considering these factors, African firms were found
to have a significant disadvantages across all performance measures. This indicates
that Africa’s disadvantages arise from its weak business environment, mainly poor
public infrastructure and lack of access to finance.
Recent empirical studies on Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA), (Iacovone et al., 2014; Scott
et al., 2014; Cissokho and Seck, 2013), also show that poor infrastructure mainly
poor supply of electricity is negatively related to firm productivity, efficiency and
growth2. This poor quality of electricity service can drive up firms’ cost of produc-
tion3 and bias their technological choices. It also affects firms’ incentive to make an
investment decision. According to Abeberese (2016), firms are not willing to locate
their business in the area where the supply of electricity is highly unreliable.
1see Iacovone et al. (2014); Escribano et al. (2009); Harrison et al. (2014)
2see also Steinbuks and Foster (2010); Nyanzu and Adarkwah (2016); Oseni and Pollitt (2015);
Adenikinju (2003)
3see Fisher-Vanden et al. (2015)
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To cope with this poor supply of electricity, firms adopt different mechanisms to
reduce the resulting effects. The commonly adopted coping strategy is investment in
self-generation of electricity. The decision to invest in self-generation depends on not
only reliability power supply but also other firm characteristics such as industry type,
firm’s power intensity level, and other firm characteristics (Steinbuks and Foster,
2010; Oseni and Pollitt, 2015; Adenikinju, 2003). Firms facing the same outage
time may have different incentive to invest in self-generation due to a difference
in their degree of vulnerability to power outages. Referring to the sample of firms
used in this study, 76% of firms in Senegal own generator which is greater than
the percentage of firms owning generator in Ghana (53%)– where power problem is
severe compared to that of Senegal ( see Figure 2.2). On the hand, in terms of power
intensity level, firms in Senegal are more power intensive than firms in Ghana. This
is a possible explanation why firm’s incentive to invest in self-generation depends
not only on the duration of outage but also on the power intensity level of a firm’s
business activities.
Although investment in self-generation is the common mitigation strategy adopted
by SSA firms, it does not always guarantee complete mitigation of outages (Been-
stock et al., 1997). The data used in this study described in (Figures 2.1 and 2.2)
also reveals that in Nigeria, where about 86% of firms own generator, firms still
suffer outage loss of 12%. In this regard, this study asks: Does investment in self-
generation help firms in mitigating outage loss and what is the outage loss differential
between firms that invested in self-generation and those that didn’t?
There is a limited literature with a objective of examining the role of investment in
self-generation in mitigating outage loss. Pasha et al. (1989) showed that investment
in self-generation reduces the reported cost of power outages in industrial sector of
Pakistan but it is impossible to infer outage cost differential between firms that
invested in self-generation and those that didn’t from their result. Steinbuks and
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Foster (2010) compared the cost and benefits of owning generator for Sub-Saharan
African firms, however, they didn’t consider the role of investing in self-generation
in mitigating outage loss. A study by Oseni and Pollitt (2015) is more close to this
study. The authors examined outage loss differential between firms that engaged in
self-generation and those that didn’t using the switching regression.
The switching regression utilized by Oseni and Pollitt (2015) is based on exogeneity
assumption of power outages and hence the independence between firm’s decision to
invest in self-generation and the corresponding outage loss that firms face. However,
this assumption may result in selectivity bias. The selectivity bias arises because of
the correlation between the outage loss that a firm face and the decision to invest in
self-generation. This is because both decision to adopt a generator and the amount of
outage loss are determined by firm characteristics, outage time and power intensity
of a firm’s business activity. This makes the error terms in the outage loss equation
and selection equation to be correlated. Ignoring this correlation results in a biased
estimates (Maddala, 1993). The endogenous switching regression overcomes this
problem because the decision to invest in self-generation is treated to be endogenous.
Thus, this study uses endogenous switching regression in a counterfactual framework
to examine the role of self-generation in mitigating outage loss and examine outage
loss differential among SSA firms that invested in self-generation and those that
didn’t.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: The following section
provides a conceptual framework and research hypothesis. Section 3 presents data
source and describes the estimation strategies and the empirical model. Section 4
presents empirical results; while the final section provides conclusions and policy
implications drawn from the study.
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2.2 Theoretical Model of Firm’s Investment in
Self-Generation
Firm’s decision to invest in self-generation, like other investment decisions, depends
on several factors including firm’s financial capacity and internal firm decision pro-
cess. In this section, a theoretical framework on a firm’s investment decision based
on the Net Present Value (NPV) criterion is discussed.
Since the availability and quality of public electricity are uncertain, a risk-neutral
firm decides whether to invest in a generator of size, Gi > 0. A firm incurs a fixed
cost k for installing a generator and a running cost of µGi per hour, which is mainly
a fuel cost. A firm that has installed an electric generator can ensure a return of
ϕGi, where ϕ > 0 is a generator’s productivity.
In a NPV approach to investment decision, all capital costs have to be weighed
against the expected future benefits and a firm undertakes an investment with a
positive NPV (DeCanio and Watkins, 1998). A firm that invests in a self-generation
gets a benefit of a reduced outage loss that the firm would have incurred in the
absence of such investment. Given the above information, the firm that invested in
a private electricity can reduce the outage loss4 by λHQ − ϕHGi, where Q is the
total annual sales of the firm in USD, λ is a measure of the degree of vulnerability
of the firm’s operation to power outages, 0 < λ ≤ 1 5 and H is total outage time in
a year 6. Thus, based on the given cost and benefit of investing in self-generation,
the NPV can be determined as:
4The amount of outage loss depends on the amount mitigated by adopting generator, even if
partial, and total duration of a power outage in a year (H).
5The value of λ = 0 indicates a situation where firm’s operation is completely immune to power
outages and excluded in this study
6 In the absence of power interruption, the reported outage loss is assumed to be zero
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NPV =
T∑
t=1
1
(1 + r)t{(λHQ− ϕHGi)− C
G
t [µGi, k, φ]} (2.1)
Where t is a year, T is the generator’s lifetime, r is the discount rate, k is the fixed
cost of generator whereas µG is a running cost, φ is financial barriers. Financial
barriers indicate among other things whether the firm has easy access to external
finance or not.
Based on the above theoretical discussions, the following empirically testable hy-
pothesis is set.
Hypothesis
Firms that invested in self-generation face higher unmitigated outage loss compared
to firms without such investment.
Firms that invested in self-generation may continue to suffer higher unmitigated
outage loss compared to firms that didn’t invest in self-generation. This could
be possible if electricity from self-generation is not enough to fully back up firm’s
electricity load and the firm is highly vulnerable to power outages.
Proof : Consider two firms with an information presented above. Assume further
that output is subjected to an hourly outage loss of λQ for firms that invested in
self-generation and θQ for firms without such investment. The outage loss function
for a firm that invested in a self-generation is given as:
Ls = λQ+ CG(µGi, k, φ)− ϕGi) (2.2)
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where CG(.) is the cost of investing in self-generation defined in equation (2.1)
The outage loss for firms that didn’t invest in self-generation is given by:
Lf = θQ (2.3)
where λ and θ measures the degree to which a firm’s business activity is vulnerable
to power outage for a firm that invested in self-generation and those that didn’t
respectively.
Thus, firms that invested in self-generation can face higher outage loss if λ > θ i.e.
highly vulnerable to power outages and the mitigating capacity of the generator is
small compared the required electricity load of the firm.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Data
The source of data for this study is the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES)
collected from firms operating in 13 Sub-Saharan African countries7 for which the
survey is conducted between between 2010 and 2016. These countries were selected
based on their sample size and the year of a survey conducted. Comparable infor-
mation using the same survey instruments across all countries are available after
2010. Thus, this study considered only countries for which the survey is available
after 2010.
Combining a firm level data for these countries, there are about 5,129 observations in
data set. However, there are firms that reported zero outage loss either because firms
are immune to outages due to the nature of their business or they have completely
7The study covers 13 SSA countries namely: Cameron, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe
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backed up their electricity load. After cleaning for these observations, 3029 firms
are left in the sample. . The sampling distribution of the data ranges from 119 firms
in Namibia and Uganda, about 4% of total sample, to 505 firms in Nigeria which is
about 17% of the sample8.
2.3.2 Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Self-generation (G) – In the WBES, firms were asked to report whether they own
generators or not during the survey period. Firms that own generator were asked
to report the share of electricity coming from self-generation (Gsh) as a percentage
of their total electricity load. The percentage of electricity from self-generation is
observed only for firms that have invested in self-generation and it is censored at
zero from left. Table (2.1) presents the descriptive statistics of investment in self-
generation and other variables used in the study and Tables in Appendix (2.5) and
(2.6) also provides additional descriptions of the data.
Outage loss: The amount of outage loss is separately computed for firms that
invested in self-generation (Ls) and for those that didn’t (Lf ). This is computed
from firm’s annual sales volume and percentage of sales lost due to outages reported
by the firm during the survey. Since all financial data including firm sales were
reported in Local Currency Units (LCUs) in the WBES, the outage loss is converted
to equivalent USD using the prevailing exchange rate for each country during the
survey period.
Figure (2.1) shows that there is a considerable variation in outage time across coun-
tries ranging from less 2 in Namibia to more than 4 ( in log days per year) in Nigeria.
The corresponding percentage of sale lost due to outage ranges from 3% in Sudan
and Namibia to about 12% in Ghana and Nigeria. The average outage time and the
corresponding percentage of sales loss are positively correlated. This suggests that
8See Table 2.5
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Figure 2.1: Outages Loss and Outage Time by Country
firms in a country where power outage is severe incur higher outage loss compared
to firms in a country where the problem is moderate.
Outage time (lnH)
The variable outage time utilized in the study is computed from the reported fre-
quency and duration of power interruptions that a firm faces in a month. Monthly
outage time is obtained by multiplying frequency of power outages with its duration
and then it is converted into yearly data assuming the same outage frequencies and
duration throughout the year. The outage time–the number of days a firm face
power cut from the public grid–also measures the reliability of power supply.
Power intensity dummy (PID)
The average industry-level power intensity is obtained from electricity expenditure
as the percentage of firm’s total cost. On the basis of the computed average industry-
level power intensity, power intensity dummy (PID) is defined as a dummy variable
56
2.3 Methodology
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev. Obs.
Outages(lnH) Outage time in days/year 2.56 1.27 3029
Outage loss Percentage of sales lost due to outage 8.65 8.53 2983
lnLs Outage loss (in $/year) for adopters 13.03 4.24 1525
lnLs Outage loss (in $/year) for non-adopters 11.71 5.23 1063
PID Power intensity dummy 0.40 0.49 3029
Constraint largest obstacle to firm’s doing business 0.16 0.37 3209
lnE Annual cost of electricity ( $/year) 7.16 3.35 2601
G Percentage of firms owning generator 0.59 0.49 3029
Gsh Share of electricity from self-generation 0.26 0.26 1730
lnL Number of permanent full time workers 3.01 1.20 3029
Age of firm Age of the firm (years) 2.51 0.70 2984
Experience (ln) Experience of the top manager (years) 2.63 0.67 2949
Ownership Percentage of firms owned by foreigners 0.20 0.40 3003
Exporters Percentage of firms engaged in export 0.14 0.35 3029
Power intensity dummy (PID) is defined on the basis of average sector-level value of electricity
expenditures as a percentage of total cost. PID takes a value of one if the average sector-level
share of electricity from total annual cost is greater than median value. Obstacle to doing business
is factors that firm reported as the main constraint to doing their business. These constraints
are collapsed into two categories as electricity (1) and others factors (0) for easy interpretation.
Observation counts differ due to non response and due to variable-specific cleaning procedures.
equal to one if the computed average industry level power intensity is greater than
the median power intensity from whole observation in the data and zero otherwise.
Figure (2.2) plots the average share of firms owning generator against the mean
outage time across countries. The Figure (2.2) illustrates that share of firms owning
generator varies across countries. The cross-sectional correlation between outage
time and share of firms owning generator is noisy but potentially positive suggesting
that firms in a country where there is high power problem tends to invest in self-
generation. For instance, in a country where electricity supply is highly unreliable
like in Nigeria, about 86% of firms own generator. On the hand, in Senegal where
power problem is relatively moderate, the share firms owning generator is about 76%
which is greater than that of Ghana and Uganda where the power problem is more
severe compared to Senegal. This shows there are factors other than the outage time
that determines firm’s decision to invest in self-generation. Firms facing the same
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Figure 2.2: Outage Time and Share of Firms Owning Generator
Outage time is measured in days per year; its mean value is computed for each country. The correlation between
outage time and share of firms owning a generator is noisy but potentially positive.
outage time my have different incentive to invest in self-generation, for example,
due to their difference in the degree of their vulnerability to power outages. In this
study, firm’s vulnerability to power outage is captured by power intensity, which is
computed by the ratio of firm’s expenditure on electricity to total annual cost of
production.
Figure (2.3) highlights important factor affecting firm’s decision to invest in self-
generation. There is a positive correlation between firm’s power intensity and a
decision to invest in self-generation. This suggest that two comparable firms facing
the same duration of power outage may have different incentive to invest in generator
due to differences in their degree of vulnerability to power outages9.
In addition to the above graphical explanations, a simple regression of power related
9Firms degree of vulnerability to power outage mainly depends on the nature of business activities
firms are engaged in. Outage of the same duration may cause large losses for some business
activities while it creates only minor inconveniences for others Beenstock et al. (1997).
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Figure 2.3: Self-generation and Firm’s Power Intensity
Power intensity is computed by taking the ratio of firm’s annual expenditure on electricity to total production cost.
The Figure shows positive correlation between power intensity and incentive to invest in self-generation. Firms in
a country with higher power intensity have higher incentive to invest in generator.
variables on outage time and power intensity is made. The variable “constraints”
in Table ( 2.2) is an indicator variable which indicates whether a firm reported
electricity as a main obstacle to doing its business or not.
Table( 2.2) shows a meaningful correlation between self-generation and measures of
electricity unreliability. The first column of Table (2.2) shows firms in a country
where power supply is highly unreliable are more likely to invest in self-generation
and the share of electricity coming from self-generation is higher for these firms.
Column 3 indicates firms that report electricity as a main obstacle to doing their
business more likely invests in self-generation, and for these firms the share of elec-
tricity from self-generation is higher compared to firms that didn’t report electricity
as a main obstacle to doing their business. Power intensity dummy is significant
and positively correlated with both self-generation status and share of electricity
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Table 2.2: Correlation of Outages with Power Variables
Dependent variable Outages(lnH) [1] PID[2] Constraint[3]
Self-generation (G) 0.0341*** 0.121*** 0.178***
(0.006) (0.018) (0.023)
Share of self-generation (Gsh) 7.883*** 8.03*** 12.32***
(0.444) (1.254) (1.524)
The dependent variables are self-generation indicator which is binary outcome and takes value of
one for firms owning generator, zero others, and share of electricity from self-generation (only for
firms that adopted generator). For the purpose of estimating the correlation among the variables,
linear probability model is assumed for self-generation indicator and the usual OLS is estimated
for the later dependent variable. Figures in brackets are standard errors. *** significant at 1%
level; ** significant at 5% level ; * significant at 10% level
from self-generation, suggesting that power intensive sectors are more likely to in-
vest in self-generation and for these sectors, the share of electricity coming from
self-generation is higher compared to less power intensive sectors.
The correlation matrix reported in Table (2.8) shows that power outage is positively
correlated with both firm’s decision to invest and the share of electricity coming
from self-generation. Moreover, the Table shows positive and significant correlation
between generator ownership and the variable “obstacle”, which indicates positive
and and significant correlation between electricity as a main obstacle to firm’s doing
business and the decision to invest in self-generation.
Other firm specific variables
Industry dummies and other firm characteristics capture important information
about the cost of generator, and firm’s financial barriers. The information on the
cost of a generator is assumed to be captured by firms’ characteristics, measured
by firm size. Specifically, because electric generation exhibits economies of scale,
larger firms are found to have smaller generation costs, and a higher probability of
investing in self-generation (Steinbuks and Foster, 2010; Oseni and Pollitt, 2015).
Firm size and age of firm capture firm’s financial barrier. Large and old firms are in
better position to ease access of external finance because of their established names
and financial capacity and hence these firms have higher probability to invest in
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self-generation.
In addition, the study also utilizes other firm specific variables such as firm owner-
ship–whether the owner of the business is domestic or foreigner, and export dummy–whether
the firm is export oriented or not. Description of all variables, including firm specific
variables are given in Table (2.1).
2.3.3 Model Specification
In this section, the empirical model is presented in line with the theoretical frame-
work discussed in (2.2). The main implication of the theoretical model discussed
in (2.2) is that under certain conditions, firms that expect positive NPV will invest
in self-generation and there is a resulting outage loss differential between firms that
invest in a self-generation and those that didn’t. This is given as,
Gi = 1 if NPV ≥ 0
Gi = 0 if NPV < 0 (2.4)
where Gi represents firm’s decision to invest in self-generation and it is 1 if the firm
invests in self-generation and 0 otherwise.
As discussed in (2.2), firm’s decision to invest in self-generation depends on outage
time, the fixed and running cost of generator, and other firm characteristics. De-
pending on firm’s decision in self-generation, there is a corresponding outage loss
differential between firms that invested in self-generation and those that didn’t. This
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can be captured by estimating the following switching regression,
Pr(Gi = 1) =Φ(β0Hic + Zicγ) (2.5)
Lsic = β0sHic +Xsicβs + εsic if Gi = 1 ≡ NPV ≥ 0 (2.6)
Lfic = β0fHic +Xfiβf + εfic if Gi = 0 ≡ NPV < 0 (2.7)
where equation (2.5) is a criterion (selection equation) that determines which regime
occurs, Φ is the standard normal distribution function, i represent firm and c is
country, Hic is the outage time that firm i in country c faces, Lsic and Lfic are
the outage loss to firms which invested in self-generation and those that didn’t
respectively, Xsic, Xfic and Zic are vectors of weakly exogenous variables in the
respective equations given above; βs, βf and γ are vectors of parameters to be
estimated, uic is error term in the selection equation (2.5). Assuming uic, εsic and
εfic are normally distributed error terms with mean zero vector and the co-variance
matrix is given by:
Cov(s, f , ui) =

δ2s δsf δsu
δfs δ
2
f δfu
δus δuf δ
2
u
 (2.8)
where δ2u is a variance of the error term in the selection equation, δ2s and δ2f are
variances of the error terms in the continuous equations, δsu is a co-variance of s
and ui, δfu is a co-variance of εf and ui.
The empirical specification of the model in (2.5)-(2.7) are given as:
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lnLsic = β0lnHic + β1slnEic + β2slnLic + β′3sXic
+λjc + ηc + εsic if Gi = 1 (2.9)
lnLfic = β0f lnHic + β1f lnEic + β2f lnLic + β′3fXic
+λjc+ηc + εfic if Gi = 0 (2.10)
Pr( Gi = 1) = Φ(β0lnHic + β1lnEic + β2lnLic + β′3Zic + λjc+ηc) (2.11)
where Zic = [ownership_i, exporter_ic , lnAgeic, lnExprience, PIDjc], Xi=[own-
ership_ic, exporter_ic]; lnLsic and lnLfic are the amount of outage loss (in USD
per year) that firms which invested in self-generation and those that didn’t invest
face respectively, lnHic is log of outage time that firm i in country c face in a year,
PIDjc is the power intensity dummy for industry j, Lic is the number of permanent
full time workers, Eic is the annul expenditure on electricity, λjc shows j industry
dummies, ηc captures c country dummies and uic is a normally distributed error
term with mean zero and variance of δ2u. Because of exclusion restriction imposed,
managerial experience, age of firm and power intensity dummy (PID) appear only in
the selection equation. The identification strategy and exclusion restriction imposed
is discussed in detail in the next section.
2.3.4 Estimation Strategy
As discussed in (2.1), firm’s decision to invest in self-generation depends on the
outage time and firm characteristics. Firm’s investment decision in turn affects the
amount of outage loss that firms face. This makes the error terms in the outage
loss equation and investment decision to be correlated. Estimation of such model by
OLS and failing to account for the correlation between the error terms will result in
a biased estimates. This motivates an endogenous switching regression model that
63
Chapter 2
Firm Performance Under Infrastructure Constraints:
Evidence from Sub-Sahara African Firms
accounts for any selectivity bias that may result from the correlation between the
error terms in the outage loss equation and investment decision (Maddala, 1993;
Fuglie and Bosch, 1995).
The endogenous switching regression model stated in (2.9)-(2.11) can be estimated
by either two step least squares or maximum likelihood method. However, both
of these estimation methods are inefficient and require potentially cumbersome ad-
justments to derive a consistent standard errors (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). The
Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) developed by Lokshin and Sajaia
(2004), overcomes this problem and yields a consistent standard errors. Thus, this
study employs the FIML to estimate the endogenous switching regression given in
(2.9)-(2.11).
For the model described above to be identified, there should be at least one variable
in the selection equation which is not included in the outage loss equations10. This
variable should affect firms’ decision to invest self-generation (the selection equation)
but not directly affects the outage loss. To achieve this, managerial experience and
average sector-level power intensity are included in the selection equation. The
rationale of using managerial experience as an instrumental variable is based on
the argument that the decision of whether a firm to invest in self-generation or not
is mainly managerial decision which mainly depends on managerial experience to
predict the nature of power interruptions and managerial capability to exploit firm’s
available resources. To the extent that good management is aimed at reducing firm’s
cost of production for a given level of output, managerial experience is expected to
be negatively correlated with firm’s decision to invest in self-generation.
The inclusion of power intensity in the selection is due to the fact that more power
intensive sectors are willing to invest in a self-generation compared less power inten-
sive sectors. The description of the data in Figure (2.3) and Table (2.2) supports
10This means there should be at least one variable in Zi in equation (2.11) which is not included
in X ′is in equations (2.9) and (2.10)
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this argument– firms that are more power intensive are more likely to own generator
compared firms that are less power intensive. Taking a clue from this, to aid further
the identification, a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is in a power inten-
sive sector or not is computed, and interacted with outage variable. Power intensity
dummy is created based on average sector-level electricity cost as a percentage of
firm’s total cost. A sector is then, classified as power intensive if the computed cost
of electricity as a percentage of total cost is above the median (4.8%) and non-power
intensive otherwise.
2.3.5 Conditional Expectations, Treatment and Heterogeneity
Effects
The endogenous switching regression model in (2.9) and (2.10) can be used to com-
pare the expected outage loss between firms that invested in self-generation and
those that didn’t. The expected outcomes with and without self-generation can be
used to calculate the expected treatment effects 11 for each group. This can be
addressed by estimating the counterfactual unmitigated outage loss level for each
group. For example, the expected outage loss with self-generation for a sample
group that actually invested in self-generation can be estimated from data on firms
in this group. The expected outage loss without self-generation for this group is
a counterfactual outcome. The same logic would describe the actual and coun-
terfactual outcomes for a group of firms without self-generation. The conditional
expected outage loss for both group of firms under actual and counterfactual condi-
tions are presented in Table (2.3). Details on how the conditional expected values
under actual and counterfactual conditions, treatment and heterogeneity effects are
computed for each group is available in Annex (2.6.1).
11Investment in self-generation is considered as voluntary treatment in which firms choose (self-
select) to invest in generator based on the anticipated gains.
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Table 2.3: Definition of Expected and Treatment Effects
Investment Decision
Sample Invest Don’t invest Treatment
Own generator E(Ls/Xs, Gi = 1) E(Lf/Xf , Gi = 1) TT
No generator E(Ls/Xs, Gi = 0) E(Lf/Xf , Gi = 0 TU
Heterogeneity Effects BH1 BH2
Ls– is the outage loss that firms which invested in self-generation face, Lf– is the outage loss
that firms which didn’t invest in self-generation face, Xs– is the observed control variables and
characteristics of firms that own generator, Xf–is the observed control variables and characteristics
of firms that don’t own generator, Gi = 1 if the firm invested in self-generation and 0 otherwise.
BH1is the base heterogeneity effect for firms that own generator with the counterfactual condition
that firms that didn’t invest in self-generation had invested in self-generation. BH2 is the base
heterogeneity effect for firms that didn’t invest in self-generation with a counterfactual condition
firms that didn’t invest in self-generation had invested in self-generation. TT–measures the effect
of generator adoption on firms that invested in generator; this is computed by taking the difference
between the actual outage loss that these firms face and the outage loss under the counterfactual
condition that if they had not invested in generator. TU–measures the effect of generator adoption
on those firms that don’t invested in a generator.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Outage Loss and Investment in Self-generation
The coefficient estimates of outage loss equation with endogenous switching due to
investment in self-generation are presented in Table(2.4). For a comparison, a single-
equation outage loss with no switching was estimated with a generator ownership
dummy (G) as explanatory variable. The coefficient estimates from this model are
biased and inconsistent but are included here to compare with the switching regres-
sion model. The result obtained using pooled OLS is reported in the first column
of Table (2.4) . The coefficient of generator ownership dummy (G) is positive and
significant implying that firms that invested in self-generation face greater outage
loss relative to firms without such investment. This result provides a preliminary
answer to the hypothesis of the study discussed in (2.2). This may be a misleading
conclusion, however, because additional endogenous effects on outage loss due to
investment in self-generation have not been properly accounted for in this simple
model.
The decision to invest in self-generation estimated by probit model for the switch-
ing equation is reported in the second column of Table (2.4). Industry and country
dummies are included in the estimation. The results from this model can be in-
terpreted as the influence of observable firm characteristics and other controls on
firm’s decision to invest in self-generation. The coefficient of outage time is positive
and significant, indicating that outage time induce firms to invest in self-generation.
The variable employment indicates the number of permanent full-time workers and
the estimated coefficient of the variable is positive and significant. This suggests
that a higher number of workers increases the likelihood that a firm invests in self-
generation. More specifically, large firms have higher incentive to invest in self-
generation compared to small firms during a period of power outages.
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Table 2.4: Outage Loss by Backup-status
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The coefficients of electricity expenditure and firm ownership are positive and sig-
nificant. This suggest that large electricity consuming firms and foreign owned
firms are more likely to invest in self- generation. The coefficient of power intensity
dummy (PID) is positive and significant. This indicates that, due to the nature of
their business activities, power intensive firms need a continues supply of power and
the probability that these firms invest in self-generation is higher compared to less
power intensive firms.
As reported in the second column of Table (2.4), the estimated coefficient of firm
age is positive and significant which indicates that the likelihood that a firm invests
in self-generation increases with age of the firm. This might possibly explains the
vulnerability and financial capacity of old firms as compared to young firms. Old
firms due to their established brand names, are more likely to have access to external
finance for their operation, including investment in self-generation. On the other
hand, old firms which run many establishments suffer a huge outage loss for the same
outage time compared to young firms with a single or few establishments. This may
make old firms to have higher incentive to invest in self-generation compared young
firms.
The variable experience, which shows the managerial experience of top manager
of the firm is negative and marginally significant. This shows, firms under the
management of experienced manager have less incentive to invest in self-generation.
This could be due to the fact that motivated and experienced managers take actions
which minimizes the firm’s production cost because investment in alternative source
of electricity would add more to cost for a given level of output. Similar literature is
that of Cissokho and Seck (2013) in which the authors explained a positive effect of
power outage on firm’s cost efficiency as a successful coping strategy. Experienced
firms organize their activities in way that could cancel the expected adverse effects
of power outages. According to Scott et al. (2014) this strategies could be in the
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form of shifting workers from tasks that are electricity intensive to tasks that are less
electricity demanding, or that don’t need electricity or intensify production at times
when electricity is running and adapt to the realities of power availability. Thus,
the result could explains the role of improved management practices in adapting to
the electricity problem.
Next, the study turns to analyze the outage loss differential among firms that in-
vested in self-generation and those that didn’t, and examine the role self-generation
in mitigating the outage loss. The FIML estimates of endogenous switching regres-
sion model for outage loss are reported in the third and fourth column of Table
(2.4). The likelihood-ratio test, reported in the last rows of Table (2.4), is statisti-
cally significant indicating that there is a self-selection in adopting self-generation.
The estimated correlation coefficient is positive and significant for firms that didn’t
invest in self-generation. This indicates the decision to invest in self-generation and
the quantity of outage loss are correlated which shows an evidence of endogenous
switching in the model.
As reported in Table (2.4), the determinants of outage loss are similar in sign and
significance for both backup and non-backup12 firms, but differ in magnitude. This
observed differences in estimated coefficients could be due to the presence of hetero-
geneity in the sample or attributed to investment in self-generation. Identification
of the heterogeneity effect in the sample and the role investment in self-generation
for both group of firms are discussed in the following section.
The coefficient of outage time is positive for both group of firms. This shows outage
loss increases with an increase in outage time. However, the impact is stronger on
a group of firms that didn’t invest in self-generation. For instance, a 1% increase in
outage time increases annual outage loss for firms that invested in self-generation
12Backup firms are those firms that have invested in self-generation while non-bank up firms are
those that don’t.
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by 0.37% while the same 1% increase in outage time increases the outage loss for
firms without such investment by 0.45%. This shows about 23% more than the
corresponding coefficient in the outage loss equation for firms with backup invest-
ment. This indicates firms that have invested in self generation have managed, even
if partial, the effect of power outages.
Similarly, outage loss increases with firm size and expenditure on electricity for
both group of firms, however, the impact is more pronounced on firms without self-
generation. This also possibly explains the importance of investing in self-generation.
2.4.2 Analysis of Outage Loss Differential
The extent to which investment in self-generation has helped firms in mitigating
outage loss can be answered by comparing the impact of self-generation on firms
that have actually invested, the effect of treatment on treated (TT ), and its impact
on those that didn’t invest under the condition that if they had invested in self-
generation; the effect of treatment on untreated (UT ). This is reported in Table
(2.5). The result indicates firms that actually invested in self-generation would have
incurred a greater outage loss if they had not invested in self generation. For in-
stance, firms in Zambia would have incurred additional 36% more than their current
outage loss if they had not invested in self-generation while the figure for firms in
Ethiopia is about 99%. On the other hand, firms that didn’t invest in self-generation
would have reduced their current outage loss between 2% to 24% if they had engaged
in self generation. This indicates the impact of self-generation is greater on firms
that have actually invested in self-generation.
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Table 2.5: Predicted Outage Loss and Treatment Effects
Backup Firms Non-Backup Firms
Country Actual Counter- TT (%) Actual Counter- UT(%)
(1) factual (2) (3) (4) factual (5) (6)
Cameroon 14.97 21.49 43.57 13.27 14.26 -7.43
Ethiopia 8.74 17.48 99.80 8.58 7.83 8.75
Ghana 10.94 16.76 53.10 8.26 10.03 -21.46
Kenya 15.33 22.66 47.84 13.30 14.20 -6.80
Malawi 15.58 21.36 37.04 13.30 15.09 -13.48
Namibia 11.38 16.71 46.75 8.97 11.10 -23.77
Nigeria 12.14 20.97 64.56 11.43 12.02 -5.17
Senegal 15.41 23.08 49.76 14.40 14.72 -2.23
Sudan 11.08 19.12 72.54 11.91 11.10 7.61
Tanzania 16.88 23.77 40.83 13.75 15.26 -11.04
Uganda 16.73 22.85 36.54 14.67 16.02 -9.20
Zambia 18.18 24.70 35.81 16.58 17.62 -6.27
Zimbabwe 10.72 17.19 60.28 9.00 10.27 -14.18
TT– is the effect of investment in self-generation on firms that invested and obtained by taking
the difference between column 1 & column 2, then divided by the first column. UT–is the effect of
investment in self-generation on firms that didn’t actually invest, computed by taking the difference
of column four and column five, then divided by column four. Both TT and UT are expressed in
percentages and TT shows the outage loss that firms that have invested in self-generation would
have incurred if they had not invested compared to the current unmitigated loss given in column 1.
UT shows the amount of outage loss that firms didn’t invest in self-generation would have reduced
had they invested in self-generation. Positive UT figures for Ethiopia and Sudan shows firms that
didn’t invest in self-generation are better off by not investing in self-generation.
Considering the observed differences in the predicted outage loss between firms
that invested in a self-generation and those that didn’t, firms that invested in self-
generation face higher outage loss on average in all countries except in Sudan com-
pared to firms that didn’t (See Table 2.5). This simple comparison is, however,
misleading because it doesn’t account for unobserved differences between the two
groups that may affects outage loss. In order to account for this, the base hetero-
geneity for both group is computed as specified in equations (2.18)–(2.19) and the
result is reported in Table (2.6). With the counterfactual condition that firms that
didn’t invest in self-generation had invested, BH1 as indicated in equation (2.18),
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the expected outage loss for firms that actually invested is higher than the outage
loss under the counterfactual condition in each of the countries except in Nigeria
and Sudan. Firms in Nigeria and Sudan faces almost the same outage loss under
actual and counterfactual conditions indicating there is no systemic sources of vari-
ation between the two groups that could result in observable differences in outage
loss. Similarly, with the counterfactual condition that firms that have invested in
self-generation didn’t invest, BH2 as indicated in equation (2.19), firms that have
invested in self-generation still face higher outage loss than firms that didn’t. This
explains the degree to which these firms are vulnerable to power outages and their
inability to completely back-up their electricity load.
Table 2.6: Predicted outage loss and heterogeneity effects
Backup firms Non-backup firms Heterogeneity effects
Country Actual Counter- Actual Counter- BH1 BH2
(1) factual (2) (3) factual (4) (5) (6)
Cameroon 14.97 21.49 13.27 14.26 0.71 8.21
Ethiopia 8.74 17.48 8.58 7.83 0.91 8.89
Ghana 10.94 16.76 8.26 10.03 0.91 8.50
Kenya 15.33 22.66 13.30 14.20 1.12 9.36
Malawi 15.58 21.36 13.30 15.09 0.48 8.05
Namibia 11.38 16.71 8.97 11.10 0.28 7.74
Nigeria 12.14 20.97 11.43 12.02 0.11 8.54
Senegal 15.41 23.08 14.40 14.72 0.68 8.68
Sudan 11.08 19.12 11.91 11.10 -0.08 7.21
Tanzania 16.88 23.77 13.75 15.26 1.61 10.02
Uganda 16.73 22.85 14.67 16.02 0.71 8.18
Zambia 18.18 24.70 16.58 17.62 0.56 8.11
Zimbabwe 10.72 17.19 9.00 10.27 0.45 8.19
BH1 is the base heterogeneity effect for backup firms with counterfactual condition that non-
backup firms had invested in self-generation, and is computed by taking difference between the
first column and 4th column. BH2 is the base heterogeneity for non-backup firms with the coun-
terfactual condition that backup firms didn’t invest in self-generation; and is computed by taking
the difference between the second and third column.
2.4.3 Extensions and Robustness Checks
This section asses the sensitivity of the result to the identification assumptions. The
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identification in the previous section is based on the use of managerial experience
and power intensity dummy in the investment decision equation and excluding them
from the outage loss equation. To asses the validity of this assumption and examine
sensitivity of the estimates to this assumptions, the model is re-estimated by relaxing
some of the assumptions. Three alternative specifications are estimated and reported
in Appendix (2.6.2). Compared to the baseline model reported in Table (2.4), the
first alternative specification is estimated with managerial experience and interaction
of power intensity dummy with outage time in the investment decision model. In
the second alternative specification, in addition to the interaction of power intensity
dummy with outage time, managerial experience is treated as categorical variable
rather than continuous and industry dummies are excluded from the outage loss
equation 13 . These categories are then included in selection equation. Finally,
in the third alternative specification, industry dummies are excluded from both
selection and outage loss equation compared to the baseline model.
Table (2.7) presents the correlation coefficients between errors terms in selection and
outage loss equations under alternative specifications. The sign and significance of
the correlation coefficients are maintained under all specifications.
Under the first alternative specification, the coefficient of interaction term, power
intensity interacted with outage time, is positive and significant. This indicates
power outages induce power intensive firms to invest more in self-generation com-
pared to less power intensive firms. Other variables of the model have maintained
their sign and statistical significance in both selection and outage loss equations. In
all cases, alternative specifications does insignificant changes compared to the result
from baseline specification (see Appendix 2.10–2.12).
13Managerial experience is categorized into five quintiles following (Iacovone et al., 2014). The
first quintile 1 contains managers that have between 0 and 6 years experience, quintile 2 is from
7 to 11 years, quintile 3 is from 12 to 16 years, quintile 4 from 17 to 26 years and quintile 5
contains managers that have more than 27 years experience
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Table 2.7: The Impact of Alternative Specifications on Correlation Coefficients
Specifications ρ1 Std. Err. ρ2 Std. Err.
Baseline specification -0.053 (0.092) 0.951*** (0.008)
Alternative specification (1) -0.065 (0.093) 0.950*** (0.008)
Alternative specification (2) -0.059 (0.091) 0.950*** (0.007)
Alternative specification (3) -0.052 (0.087) 0.948*** (0.008)
Figures in brackets are standard errors. In alternative specification (1), the interaction of PID with outages time
is added to the investment decision equation compared baseline specification. Managerial experience is treated as
categorical variable and industry dummies are excluded from outage loss equations in alternative specification (2);
while in specification (3) only industry dummies are excluded from both the outage loss and selection equations
compared to the baseline equation.
2.4.4 Why do Firms that Invested in Self-generation Face
Higher Outage Losses?
As discussed in (2.4.2), firms that invested in self-generation would have suffered
from 36% to 99% additional outage loss compared to the current outage loss the
firms have incurred. This shows self-generation has helped these firms by reducing
the outage loss by 36% to 99% that these firms would have incurred. However,
comparing the outage loss between a group of firms that invested in self-generation
and those that didn’t, a group of firms that invested in self-generation continued to
face higher outage loss compared to firms without such investment. Thus, a question
that arises from the analysis is that why firms that invested in self-generation still
suffers higher outage losses?
This is mainly due to the fact that firms make only partial investments which can’t
fully backup their electricity load. Table (2.7) shows that the share of electricity
coming from self-generation is only 9% in Sudan, and it is 11% in Cameroon. Rel-
atively high percentage of backup electricity is observed in Nigeria, which is about
53%. The implication is that firms may backup only critical components of their
operation due to high cost of self-generation or lack of access to finance. The cost of
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self-generation is approximately 3 times as costly as the cost of electricity supplied
by the public grid (Steinbuks and Foster, 2010; Adenikinju, 2003). Firms may also
opt for less than full backup investment in self-generation due to financial constraint
and choose to backup only critical components of their operation. Thus, a firm may
invest in self-generation but remain vulnerable to power outages.
2.4.5 Future Research Agenda
This paper examined the role of investment in self-generation in mitigating outage
loss and the outage loss differential between firms that invested in self-generation
and those that didn’t. The result shows that, despite their investment in self-
generation, firms that invested in self-generation continuous to face higher outage
loss compared to firms without such investment. This might be due to the inability
of firms to self-generate the required power load by investing in self-generation. In
this regard, Beenstock et al. (1997) also argued that investment in self-generation
does not guarantee a complete mitigation of outage loss. For this matter, it is
important to explore factors behind firm’s sub-optimal investment in self-generation.
For instance, factors such as firm’s lack of access to finance could limit the scope of
a firm’s ability to invest in self-generation.
Table (2.8) shows classification of firms as credit constrained or not (see 2.6.3 for a
definition firm’s credit constraint) by firm size. Relatively high percentage of large
firms are credit unconstrained while a large share of small firms were found to be
credit constrained. This might shows that large firms are more likely to have access
to external funds to finance their operations and hence less credit constrained than
small firms.
In order to understand more about the correlation between lack of access to finance
and firm’s decision to invest in self-generation, a simple pairwise correlation between
firm’s investment decision in self-generation and alternative definitions of credit
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Table 2.8: Classification of firms by alternative definition of credit constraint
Definition Constrained Unconstrained Total
Perception approach 59% 41% 100%
Credit application information 47% 53% 100%
Firm Size Small Medium Large
Percentage of Constrained 62.9% 56.9% 48.5%
Percentage of Unconstrained 37.1% 43.1% 51.0%
Perception approach is used to classify firms as credit constrained and unconstrained, for definitions of firm’s
credit constraint, see 2.6.3
Table 2.9: Correlation Matrix
Variables G Gsh Constraint Constraint1 Outage(ln)
G 1
Gsh 0.571*** 1
Constraint -0.109*** -0.103*** 1
Constraint1 -0.061*** -0.034** 0.338** 1
Outage(ln) 0.216*** 0.506*** 0.106** 0.028 1
*** P ≤0.01; ** 0.01<P ≤0.05; * 0.05<P ≤0.1. G is firm’s decision to investment in self-generation which takes
1 for firms that invested in self-generation and zero other wise. Gsh is the share of electricity from self-generation,
Constraint- is the perception approach to credit constraint definition and takes value from 0 to 4 with higher value
implies more credit constraint. Constraint1 is the credit application information definition of credit constraint and
takes 1 if the firm is credit constrained and 0 otherwise. Outages is the total power interruption in days a firm faces
in a year.
constraint is given in Table (2.9). The correlation matrix shows a meaningful result
in which all measures of credit constraints are negatively correlated with both firm’s
decision to invest and the share of electricity from self-generation. This suggests that
credit constraints affect a firm’s decision to invest and the share of electricity from
self-generation negatively. On the other hand, power outage is positively correlated
with both firm’s decision to invest and volume of investment which implies unreliable
supply of public electricity force firms to invest in private substitutes. Moreover,
Table (2.9) shows that positive and significant correlation between the different
definitions of credit constraints which implies the consistency of the alternative
measures of credit constraints. Thus, this preliminary result supports the augment
given in section 2.4.4 above that firms choose to make sub-optimal investment in
self-generation due to lack of access to finance.
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2.5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
2.5.1 Conclusions
The study examined the role of self-generation in mitigating the outage loss and
evaluated the outage loss differential between firms that invested in self-generation
and those that didn’t. To address this, the study used the WBES data collected from
firms operating in 13 SSA countries. The study employed an endogenous switching
regression in a counterfactual framework to explain the outage loss differential among
firms that invested in self-generation and those that didn’t. The result shows that
the decision to invest in self-generation is affected by firm characteristics such as firm
size, export engagement, and business environment. Moreover, the study shows that
firms operating in power intensive sectors are more likely to invest in self-generation
compared to firms in less-power intensive sectors.
Outage loss is separately estimated for firms that invested in self-generation and
those that didn’t. The result shows a differential impact of outage intensity and
firm size on outage loss with stronger effect observed on firms that didn’t invest in
self-generation. Even though this differences could be attributed partially to the
heterogeneity effect among the two group, it explains the role of self-generation in
mitigating outage losses.
Although self-generation has reduced the amount of outage loss for firms that have
invested in self-generation, these firms continue to face higher unmitigated outage
loss relative to firms that didn’t invest in self-generation. Comparing outage loss be-
tween the two group under actual and counterfactual conditions, higher unmitigated
outage loss is observed among firms that invested in self-generation. This indicates
the degree to which these firms are vulnerable to power outages and their inabil-
ity to completely backup their electricity demand relative to the required electricity
load. In spite of this, firms that have invested in self-generation would have incurred
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36%-99% more outage loss if they didn’t engage in self-generation. Similarly, firms
that didn’t invest in self-generation would have reduced their outage loss by 2% -
24% if they had engaged in self generation.
Thus, it can be concluded that firm’s willingness to invest in self-generation primarily
depend not only on outage time but also the degree to which firm’s operation is
vulnerable to power outages and the effect of self-generation is higher on a group of
firms that have invested in self-generation.
2.5.2 Policy Implications
From the above conclusions, the following policy implications can be drawn. The
first policy implication of the study is differential supply interruption should be
followed by public authorities based on firms’ degree of vulnerability. It would be
beneficial if firms whose operation are more vulnerable to power outages are allowed
to get preferential power supply advantage. This could be possible by arranging
a binding contract between vulnerable firms and power companies, so that power
companies charge the optimal tariff for supplying secure power for vulnerable firms.
In turn, firms should be compensated if the power companies fail to do so. This
helps vulnerable firms expand their production without fearing the risk of power
outages.
The result indicates in countries where the supply of electricity highly unreliable like
in Nigeria, the expansion of self-generated electricity is high (about 86% of firms own
generator)–generally a more expensive electricity source than the public grid. This
indicates a high willingness to pay for reliable power. This may provide an opportu-
nity for the government and the power companies to finance investments that make
the power supply more reliable. Thus, public authorities should remove subsidies
and introduce optimal tariffs that are cost recovering for new grid investment.
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2.6 Appendix
Table 2.5: Sample Size by Country
Country Sample size Percentage Survey Year
Cameroon 126 4.16 2016
Ethiopia 423 13.97 2015
Ghana 280 9.24 2013
Kenya 317 10.47 2013
Malawi 170 5.61 2014
Namibia 117 3.86 2014
Nigeria 505 16.67 2014
Senegal 126 4.16 2014
Sudan 227 7.49 2014
Tanzania 194 6.40 2013
Uganda 119 3.93 2013
Zambia 241 7.96 2013
Zimbabwe 184 6.07 2016
Total 3,029 100
Source: Author’s computation based on data described in the text.
Table 2.6: Table 9: Sample size by sector and firm size
Sector Firm size Total
Small Medium Large
Manufacturing 699 475 255 1429
Services 726 360 139 1225
Retails 269 83 23 375
Total 1694 918 417 3029
2.6.1 Conditional Expectations, Treatment and Heterogeneity
Effects
The conditional expected outage loss for both group under actual and counterfactual
conditions are presented in Table (2.8). These conditional expectations are defined
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Table 2.7: Percentage of electricity coming from self-generation
Share of electricity from self-generation
Country Mean Gsh (%) Sdt.Dev.
Cameroon 11.12 9.62
Ethiopia 21.94 24.78
Ghana 18.04 12.56
Kenya 13.30 13.54
Malawi 20.02 19.61
Namibia 21.09 20.53
Nigeria 53.79 27.40
Senegal 12.71 17.13
Sudan 9.31 14.27
Tanzania 22.45 13.11
Uganda 14.76 18.96
Zimbabwe 19.96 22.70
Share of electricity coming from self-generation is computed as the ration of electricity from self-generation to total
electricity load of the firm.
as follows:
E(Ls/Xs , Gi = 1) = Xsβs + δsρ1
f(γZi)
F (γZi)
(2.12)
E(Lf/Xf , Gi = 0) = Xfβf + δfρ2
f(γZi)
F (γZi)
(2.13)
E(Ls/Xf ,Gi = 0) = Xfβs − δfρ2 f(γZi)(1− F (γZi)) (2.14)
E(Lf/Xs , Gi = 1) = Xsβf − δsρ1 f(γZi)(1− F (γZi)) (2.15)
where F is a cumulative normal distribution function, f is a normal density distri-
bution, ρ1 measures correlation between εs and ui, ρ2 measures correlation εf and
ui.
Equations in (2.12) and (2.13) are important to estimate the expected unmitigated
outage losses for firms that invested in self-generation and those that didn’t for firms
actually observed in the sample respectively, while Equations (2.14) and (2.15) are
their respective counterfactual expected unmitigated outage losses. The use of these
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Table 2.9: Definitions of conditional expectations, treatment and heterogeneity ef-
fects
Investment decision
Sample Invest Don’t invest Treatment
Own generator E(Ls/Xs, Gi = 1) E(Lf/Xf , Gi = 1) TT
No generator E(Ls/Xs, Gi = 0) E(Lf/Xf , Gi = 0 TU
Heterogeneity Effects BH1 BH2
Ls– is the outage loss firms that invested in self-generation face, Lf– is the outage loss firms that
didn’t invest in self-generation face, Xs– is the observed control variables and characteristics of
firms that own generator, Xf–is the observed control variables and characteristics of firms that
don’t own generator, Gi = 1 if the firm invested in self-generation and 0 otherwise. BH1is the
base heterogeneity effect for firms that own generator with the counterfactual that firms that didn’t
invest in self-generation had invested in self-generation. BH2 is the base heterogeneity effect for
firms that didn’t invest in self-generation with a counterfactual condition firms that didn’t invest
in self-generation had invested in self-generation. TT–measures the effect of generator adoption
on firms that invested in generator; this is computed by taking the difference between the actual
outage loss that these firms face and the outage loss under the counterfactual condition that if
they had not invested in generator. TU–measures the effect of generator adoption on those firms
that didn’t invest in a generator .These concepts are discussed below.
conditional expectations, combined with consideration of the self-generation variable
as a treatment variable, allows the estimation of the causal effects of self-generation
on outage loss.
Following Heckman et al. (2001), the effect of generator adoption on firms that have
actually adopted, “the effect of treatment on treated (TT ),” is computed by taking
the difference between equation (2.12) and equation (2.15):
TT = E(Ls/Xs, Gowi = 1)− E(Lf/Xf , Gowi = 1) (2.16)
This represents the effect of investing in self generation on firms’ outage loss that
have actually invested in self-generation. Similarly, the effect of self-generation on
firms that didn’t invest in self-generation, “the effect of treatment on the untreated
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(TU)” is computed by taking the difference between (2.13) and (2.14).
TU = E(Lf/Xf , Gowi = 0)− E(Ls/Xs, Gowi = 0) (2.17)
The conditional expectation in equations (2.12)-(2.15) can also be used to compute
the heterogeneity effects. For instance, firms that invested in self-generation may
have faced higher outage loss than those firms that didn’t invest regardless of their
decision to invest in self-generation but because of the nature their business and
other firm characteristics. Adapting Carter and Milon (2005) concept of base het-
erogeneity, the effect of base heterogeneity for the group of firms that invested in
self-generation is computed by taking the difference between equation in (2.12) and
(2.14)
BH1 = E(Ls/Xs, Gi = 1)− E(Ls/Xs, G = 0) (2.18)
Similarly, for those firms that didn’t invest in self-generation, the effect of base
heterogeneity is the difference between equation (2.13) and (2.15)
BH2 = E(Lf/Xf , Gi = 0)− E(Lf/Xf , Gi = 1) (2.19)
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2.6.2 Alternative Specifications for Switching Regression
Table 2.10: Alternativee Specification 1
Adoption decision Adopters Non-adopters
Variable Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err
Outages(ln) 0.0203 0.027 0.366*** 0.075 0.446*** 0.112
Employment(ln) 0.386*** 0.033 0.818*** 0.091 2.17*** 0.151
Elec. expend.(ln) 0.047*** 0.015 0.229*** 0.038 0.569*** 0.070
Export 0.009 0.092 0.482** 0.215 0.684* 0.417
Ownership 0.189** 0.084 0.079 0.207 0.618* 0.381
Experience (ln) -0.068* 0.037
Af (ln) 0.087*** 0.035
PID*Outages(ln) 0.064*** 0.016
Constant -0.631** 0.232 6.82*** 0.629 5.64*** 0.930
ρ1 -0.065 0.093
ρ2 0.950*** 0.008
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number Obs. 2237
Log likelihood -6796
Wald χ2(17) 1335 Prob >χ2 = 0.000
LR test of independent equations: χ2(1) = 831 Prob >χ2 = 0.000
PID–is the power intensity dummy, which takes value of one if the average industry -level power
intensity is greater than the median value and zero other wise. In this specification, in addi-
tion to managerial experience, identification is achieved by the inclusion of the interaction term
PIDlnoutages which is the interaction of power intensity indicator and the outage time.
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Table 2.11: Alternative Specification 2
Adoption decision Adopters Non-adopters
Variable Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err
Outages(ln) 0.025 0.027 0.360*** 0.074 0.459*** 0.110
Employment(ln) 0.387*** 0.032 0.834*** 0.090 2.18*** 0.148
Elec. expend.(ln) 0.050*** 0.015 0.226*** 0.037 0.550*** 0.068
Export 0.004 0.090 0.493** 0.212 0.811** 0.417
Ownership 0.178** 0.205 0.079 0.207 0.487* 0.371
Expc2 -0.157*** 0.066
Expc3 -0.151** 0.069
Expc4 -0.166*** 0.068
Expc5 -0.178** 0.078
Age(ln) 0.071** 0.034
PIDOutagesln 0.058*** 0.015
Constant -0.538** 0.202 6.27*** 0.529 5.98*** 0.818
ρ1 -0.059 0.091
ρ2 0.950*** 0.007
Industry dummies Yes No No
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number Obs. 2291
Log likelihood -6867
Wald χ2(17) 1356 Prob >χ2 = 0.000
LR test of independent equations: χ2(1) = 612 Prob >χ2 = 0.000
PID–is the power intensity dummy, which takes value of one if the average industry level power
intensity is greater than the median value and zero other wise. In this specification; industry
dummies are excluded from outage loss equations.
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Table 2.12: Alternative Specification 3
Adoption decision Adopters Non-adopters
Variable Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err Coef. Std.err
Outages(ln) 0.057** 0.025 0.312*** 0.073 0.522*** 0.113
Employment (ln) 0.430*** 0.027 1.066*** 0.083 2.905*** 0.133
Export 0.052 0.086 0.373* 0.215 0.712* 0.422
Ownership 0.112 0.084 0.252 0.200 0.691* 0.376
Experience (ln) -0.049 0.035
Age(ln) 0.064** 0.031
PID 0.205*** 0.042
Constant -0.257 0.163 8.032*** 0.416 9.986*** 0.676
ρ1 -0.052 0.087
ρ2 0.948*** 0.008
Industry dummies No No No
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number Obs. 2466
Log likelihood -7512
Wald χ2(16) 1394 Prob >χ2 = 0.000
LR test of independent equations: χ2(1) = 1154 Prob >χ2 = 0.000
Compared to the third specification, industry dummies are excluded from both adoption decision
equation and the outage loss equations. Identification is achieved through the inclusion of PID
and Experience in decision equation.
2.6.3 Definition of Credit Constraint
In the literature, there are different approach to define firm’s credit constraint. Two
of them are discussed here.
Perception approach: In the perception approach to credit constraint, firms are
asked to rate the degree to which lack of access to finance is an obstacle to doing their
business Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006); Asiedu et al. (2013). In the WBES, firms
are given a categorized choice from no obstacle to very severe obstacle. Following
Hansen and Rand (2014); Asiedu et al. (2013) approach, firms were categorized
as credit constrained if they has reported lack of access to finance is moderate,
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major and very severe constraint to doing its business and zero otherwise (details
are reported in Table 2.13.
Credit application information: based on the credit application information,
firms are classified as credit constrained or not based on whether firms have ap-
plied for a loan and stated reasons for not applying. Following earlier studies in the
area, Hansen and Rand (2014); Bigsten et al. (2003), a firm is categorized as credit
constrained–constraint1– if: (i) the firm has applied for a loan and was denied, (ii)
didn’t applied for a loan due to reasons such as “application procedures were com-
plex”, “collateral requirements were too high”, or “possible loan size and maturity
were insufficient”. If firms did not apply for a loan because they don’t need one or
applied for a loan and were approved, they are classified as unconstrained (see Table
2.14 for details).
Table 2.13: Access to finance as obstacle to doing business
To what degree access to finance is obstacle Percentage Category
to the current operation of this firm?
No obstacle 17.37% unconstrained
Minor Obstacle 23.28% unconstrained
Moderate obstacle 22.13% constrained
Major obstacle 23.87% constrained
Very severe obstacle 13.36% constrained
The column category shows whether the firm is credit constrained or not which is based on the
perception approach to definition of credit constraint in section 2.2
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Table 2.14: Loan application and reasons for not applying
Did this establishment applied for credits or loan?
Yes 19.83%Outcome of application
approved rejected in process
94.22% 0.92% 4.85%
Category unconstrained constrained NC
No 80.17%reason for not applying
no need complex pro. interest unfav. coll. requ. loan size others
46.39% 10.78% 17.66% 12.75% 2.04% 10.38%
Category unconst constr constr constr constr constr
Categories are based on the definition given above, the credit application information approach.
Unconst and constr indicates unconstrained and constrained respectively. Firms that have applied
but their application is still in process during the survey are not considered (NC).
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